시장경쟁과 기업의 내부효율성
Product Market Competition and Internal Efficiency of the Firm
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본 논문은 기업의 주주가 경영자에게 경영을 대리하게 하여 본인-대리인관계(principal-agent relationship)가 발생하는 상황에서 상품시장경쟁이 기업의 내부효율성에 영향을 미치는 메커니즘을 분석한다. 본 논문에서는 두 종류의 기업을 고려한다. 하나는 기존기업(incumbents)이고, 다른 하나는 신규 진입기업(entrants)이다. 각 기존기업의 주주는 경영자에게 경영을 위임하고 경영자의 노력을 관찰하지 못하여 도덕적 해이가 발생한다. 기존기업의 경영자는 두 종류의 일을 수행하는데, 하나는 비용절감을 위한 노력(생산적인 노력)이고, 다른 하나는 진입장벽을 구축하기 위한 노력(비생산적인 노력)이다. 기존기업의 수로 측정되는 경쟁도의 증가는 두 가지 효과를 유발한다. 하나는 ‘산출효과’로서 경영자의 생산적인 노력을 감소시키고, 다른 하나는 ‘노력대체효과’로서 비생산적인 노력을 감소시키고 동시에 생산적인 노력을 유도한다. 본 논문은 어떠한 조건에서 시장경쟁이 생산적인 노력에 대한 유인을 제공하는 비용을 감소시켜 기업의 내부효율성을 증진하는가를 살펴본다.
Abstract
This paper analyzes a mechanism through which product market competition affects allocation of the managerial efforts. There are two types of firms, incumbents and entrants. Each incumbent firm delegates its control to a manager and cannot observe the manager's total effort. The managers of incumbent firms allocate their effort to two different activities: cost reduction (productive effort) and rent protection (unproductive effort). An increase in competition, measured by the number of incumbent firms, has two effects: an "output effect" which decreases the managerial incentive for productive effort, and an "effort substitution effect" that makes managers exert more productive effort and less unproductive effort. This paper identifies the conditions under which product market competition lowers the cost of providing incentives for productive effort and hence, to the conclusion that increased competition leads to increased efficiency.
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