간접접근전략 관점에서 제4차 중동전쟁 분석 - 수에즈 전역(戰役)을 중심으로 -

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the Crossing Operation of the Egyptian Army and the Inversely Crossing Operation of the Israeli Army from the perspective of Liddell Hart’s Indirect Approach Strategy, focusing on the Suez campaign of the Fourth Middle East War. The focus of the study is to analyze how the crossing and inversely crossing operations of the Suez campaign were carried out by the two countries in terms of four key elements of the Indirect Approach Strategy: Dislocation, Line of least resistance and expectation, Distraction, Alternative objectives. The results of the study are as follows. The Egyptian army secured the initiative of the battlefield by applying Liddell Hart’s Indirect Approach Strategy to its initial strike based on lessons learned in the past wars in the early phase of the war. However, the military strategy of avoiding follow-up attacks and preparing favorable political conditions by conducting long-term war of attrition in the form of defense was established without exploitation and the defense line was established. This decision gave the Israeli Forces a chance to strike back, thus shifting the initiative of the battlefield, which eventually resulted in the Israeli forces’ inversely crossing operation of the Suez Canal and the Third Army’s isolation. On the other hand, the Israeli forces was on the verge of defeat, severely damaged by the Egyptian forces’ first strike, but turned the tide of the war by reorganizing its forces and counterattacking as the Egyptian forces shifted to a defensive posture without exploitation. And it succeeded in a bold and surprise inversely crossing operation of the Suez Canal, isolating the Third Army of Egypt to respond to the cease-fire negotiations of the U.N. As such, Israeli forces achieved a limited victory in ending the war by applying Liddell Hart’s Indirect Approach Strategy, which had a decisive impact on their military thought, to the overall conduct of the war.