CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS: POSITIVE EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS, INCENTIVE MECHANISM DESIGN, AND EMPIRICAL STUDY
2
조회
0
다운로드
2
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
We study how poor quality of institution, such as corruption in public procurement auction, could hurt welfare. We show how competition effect could improve the cost-efficiency but not the quality of a public procurement auction with corruption. In fact, no incentive mechanism can be efficient in this auction if qualities are non-contractible. An empirical study suggests that increasing the number of bidders does increase the percentage cost efficiency albeit at a decreasing rate and decreases the percentage cost efficiency after it reaches a certain number of bidders.
Abstract
We study how poor quality of institution, such as corruption in public procurement auction, could hurt welfare. We show how competition effect could improve the cost-efficiency but not the quality of a public procurement auction with corruption. In fact, no incentive mechanism can be efficient in this auction if qualities are non-contractible. An empirical study suggests that increasing the number of bidders does increase the percentage cost efficiency albeit at a decreasing rate and decreases the percentage cost efficiency after it reaches a certain number of bidders.
참고문헌 (23)
- The Effect of Corruption on Bidding Behavior in First-Price Auctions, "Arozamena, L.", SSRN, ~ (2005)
- Asker, J., "Properties of Scoring Auction", RAND Journal of Economics, 39(1), pp.69~85 (2008), RAND Corporation
- Athey, S., "Single Crossing Properties And The Existence Of Pure Strategy Equilibria In Games Of Incomplete Information", Econometrica, 69(4), pp.861~889 (2001)
- Single Crossing Properties And The Existence Of Pure Strategy Equilibria In Games Of Incomplete Information, "Athey, S.", MIT, ~, pp.97 (1997), 11
- Bewley, T., "Knightian Decision Theory: Part I" (1986), Yale University
- Bliss, C., "Does Competition Kill Corruption?", Journal of Political Economy, 105(5), pp.1001~1023 (1997)
- Burguet, R., "Competitive Procurement with Corruption", RAND Journal of Economics, 35(1), pp.50~68 (2004)
- Burguet, R., "Bribery and Favoritism by Auctioneer in Sealed- Bid Auctions", The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 7(1) (2007)
- Celentani, M., "Corruption and Competition In Procurement", European Economic Review, 46, pp.1273~1303 (2002)
- Chateauneuf, A., "Choice under Uncertainty with the Best and Worst in Mind: Neo-additive Capacities", Journal of Economic Theory, 137, pp.538~567 (2007)
- Che, Y.K., "Design Competition Through Multidimensional Auction", RAND Journal of Economics, 23, pp.668~680 (1993)
- Costa-Gomes, M.A., "Learning, Non-equilibrium Beliefs, and Non-pecuniary Payoffs in an Experimental Game", Economic Theory, 22(2) (2003)
- Crawford, V.P., "Level-k Auctions: Can Non-equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner’s Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions", Econometrica, 75(6) (2007)
- Dasgupta, P., "Efficient Auctions", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(2), pp.341~388 (2000)
- Esõ, P., "Bribing and Signalling in Second Price Auctions", Games and Economic Behavior, 47, pp.299~324 (2004)
- Gilboa, I., "Maximin Expected Utility With A Unique Prior", Journal of Mathematical Economics, 18, pp.141~153 (1989)
- Jehiel, P., "Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations", Econometrica, 69(5), pp.1237~ (2001)
- Knight, F., "Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit" (1921), Mass
- Lengwiler, Y., "Bid Rigging, An Analysis of Corruption In Auctions" (2005), mimeo
- Maskin, E., "Auctions and Privatization, in : Privatization", pp.115~136 (1992), Institut fur Weltwirtschaften der Universität Kiel
- Menezes, F.M., "Corruption and Auctions", Journal of Mathematical Economics, 42(1), pp.97~108 (2006)
- Myerson, R.B., "Game Theory. Analysis of Conflict" (1991), Harvard University Press
- Wihardja, M.M., "Competition and Corruption in Public Procurement Auction: Practical Application of the E-Procurement in Indonesia" (2007), Cornell University