Searching for Solutions to Verification Problems in Denuclearization of North Korea
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The purpose of this paper is to find alternatives to resolve the verification problem, a key issue in the upcoming North Korean denuclearization negotiations. The author points out that the failure of denuclearization in North Korea is due to the failure of agreement between the parties on the issue as well as the negotiation strategy. The author suggests three alternatives to the North Korean nuclear inspection: First, it is necessary to consider the verification problem in the stage of the negotiation strategy with regard to the inspection of the North Korean nuclear issue. In this regard, the deal should be done in a way of a grand bargain through a big deal, not a step-by-step approach. Then, the short-term implementation making the dialogue a momentum should be considered. And last, to continue the current sanctions on North Korea until the denuclearization of North Korea is visible is necessary. Second, the regulatory body for verification of the North Korean nuclear program should focus on maximizing efficiency. Verification needs to maintain a framework of cooperation between the U.S. control and the relevant international organizations such as the IAEA. In other words, the participation of other countries and organizations can be discussed while the verifier (the United States) and the examinee (North Korea) are clearly defined. Third, the verification process needs to focus on maximum pre-emptive denuclearization. In other words, it is a priority to implement the voluntary submission and verification of data by North Korea, and to carry out additional verification or onsite visits as follow-up measures. It is considered desirable to promptly carry out the disposal procedures and pursue the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program in parallel with nuclear weapons, materials and facilities that have undergone certain verification procedures.
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to find alternatives to resolve the verification problem, a key issue in the upcoming North Korean denuclearization negotiations. The author points out that the failure of denuclearization in North Korea is due to the failure of agreement between the parties on the issue as well as the negotiation strategy. The author suggests three alternatives to the North Korean nuclear inspection: First, it is necessary to consider the verification problem in the stage of the negotiation strategy with regard to the inspection of the North Korean nuclear issue. In this regard, the deal should be done in a way of a grand bargain through a big deal, not a step-by-step approach. Then, the short-term implementation making the dialogue a momentum should be considered. And last, to continue the current sanctions on North Korea until the denuclearization of North Korea is visible is necessary. Second, the regulatory body for verification of the North Korean nuclear program should focus on maximizing efficiency. Verification needs to maintain a framework of cooperation between the U.S. control and the relevant international organizations such as the IAEA. In other words, the participation of other countries and organizations can be discussed while the verifier (the United States) and the examinee (North Korea) are clearly defined. Third, the verification process needs to focus on maximum pre-emptive denuclearization. In other words, it is a priority to implement the voluntary submission and verification of data by North Korea, and to carry out additional verification or onsite visits as follow-up measures. It is considered desirable to promptly carry out the disposal procedures and pursue the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program in parallel with nuclear weapons, materials and facilities that have undergone certain verification procedures.
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