Negotiating Nuclear Arms Control with North Korea: Why and How?
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Pressure policies to induce North Korea’s unilateral denuclearization failed to achieve measurable progress toward that objective. The consolidation of nuclear and missile capabilities by North Korea points to the need for a new strategy to mitigate the potential for conflict: to pursue progress toward peace and denuclearization simultaneously. The most appropriate mechanism for implementing such a strategy is arms control, defined here as a progressive series of restrictions, limitations and constraints on arms (nuclear and conventional) and associated steps that reduce the risks of conflict and insulate relations against crises and escalation. Detractors of arms control for North Korea argue that it would convey status as a possessor of nuclear weapons, and that it would require accepting some level of mutual deterrence. States would need to consider such criticisms as they weigh the risks and costs of pursuing arms control compared to alternatives such as containment and deterrence. An arms control-oriented roadmap would integrate parallel progress on establishing a durable peace regime and capping and then reducing the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons. Monitoring and verifying compliance with this type of roadmap would require a hybrid approach drawing on both traditional safeguards-style methods and novel approaches designed to build confidence.
Abstract
Pressure policies to induce North Korea’s unilateral denuclearization failed to achieve measurable progress toward that objective. The consolidation of nuclear and missile capabilities by North Korea points to the need for a new strategy to mitigate the potential for conflict: to pursue progress toward peace and denuclearization simultaneously. The most appropriate mechanism for implementing such a strategy is arms control, defined here as a progressive series of restrictions, limitations and constraints on arms (nuclear and conventional) and associated steps that reduce the risks of conflict and insulate relations against crises and escalation. Detractors of arms control for North Korea argue that it would convey status as a possessor of nuclear weapons, and that it would require accepting some level of mutual deterrence. States would need to consider such criticisms as they weigh the risks and costs of pursuing arms control compared to alternatives such as containment and deterrence. An arms control-oriented roadmap would integrate parallel progress on establishing a durable peace regime and capping and then reducing the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons. Monitoring and verifying compliance with this type of roadmap would require a hybrid approach drawing on both traditional safeguards-style methods and novel approaches designed to build confidence.
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