스피노자의 ‘지속’과 공통개념 형성의 문제

Abstract

This paper aims to explicate Spinoza’s notion of ‘duration’ presented in chapter 8 of Alexandre Lefebvre’s The Image of Law. I use, according to Lefebvre’s way, Deleuze’s interpretation of Spinoza, and try to keep up with the process in which Spinoza explains the ‘duration’. I draw from this process the conclusion that the ‘duration’ penetrates the internal and external aspects of modes. Also by way of considering the problem of ‘time’ from that process, I assert that the ‘time’ is not a mere illusion. In that respect Spinoza’s argument on ‘duration’ and ‘time’ generates the problem of the ‘encounter of modes’. Although this ‘encounter’ is seen as a contingency, it has a series of necessity. In order to demonstrate that the encounter is necessary, however, I assert that although both the ‘duration’ and the ‘time’ are only produced from an imagination of the human idea, these products of the imagination include a kind of essential elements, and this indicates that the modes as the affections of substance finally contain a kind of essential elements. And then I argue that the positive aspects of these encounters constitute the ‘common notions’. In this way, I conclude that the ‘common notions’ in Spinoza are the only way to vindicate the positive duration of the finite modes.