North Korea’s Nuclear Command and Control Estimate: Variables and Trends
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For the purpose of estimating North Korea’s nuclear command and control, this study first reclassified the key variables of the previous studies into two axes: external security factors and domestic political factors. Next, it traced Pyongyang’s changes in these variables after Kim Jong Un came to power, especially from the point of accelerated nuclear and missile development in 2016. Those findings led to the confirmation that the North is under elevated pressure towards the delegative model, given the security situation and the necessity for doctrine and posture upgrade. In the realm of internal political factors, it can be said that the party’s control over the military has been strengthened compared to the Kim Jong Il period, and there were few specific signs that Chairman Kim and policy-making groups are more concerned about military coups or disobedience than before. Comparing this with Pakistan that has institutionalized the pre-delegation of authority to use tactical nuclear weapons, etc., the pressure imposed on North Korea toward the delegative model must be relatively greater and the pressure toward the assertive model may be smaller. In order to verify the above theoretical discussions, this research traced the North’s mention of nuclear capabilities and the composition and content of institutional devices and military exercises after Kim Jong Un came to power. This draws the conclusion that Pyongyang has been making significant efforts in recent years to respond to the changes in the major external variables discussed earlier. In particular, the North has been grappling with the time-urgency issue and repeatedly emphasized the clear distinction between tactical and strategic weapons, which can signal that Pyongyang will separate the delegative and assertive command and control models according to the type of nuclear capabilities in the near future.
Abstract
For the purpose of estimating North Korea’s nuclear command and control, this study first reclassified the key variables of the previous studies into two axes: external security factors and domestic political factors. Next, it traced Pyongyang’s changes in these variables after Kim Jong Un came to power, especially from the point of accelerated nuclear and missile development in 2016. Those findings led to the confirmation that the North is under elevated pressure towards the delegative model, given the security situation and the necessity for doctrine and posture upgrade. In the realm of internal political factors, it can be said that the party’s control over the military has been strengthened compared to the Kim Jong Il period, and there were few specific signs that Chairman Kim and policy-making groups are more concerned about military coups or disobedience than before. Comparing this with Pakistan that has institutionalized the pre-delegation of authority to use tactical nuclear weapons, etc., the pressure imposed on North Korea toward the delegative model must be relatively greater and the pressure toward the assertive model may be smaller. In order to verify the above theoretical discussions, this research traced the North’s mention of nuclear capabilities and the composition and content of institutional devices and military exercises after Kim Jong Un came to power. This draws the conclusion that Pyongyang has been making significant efforts in recent years to respond to the changes in the major external variables discussed earlier. In particular, the North has been grappling with the time-urgency issue and repeatedly emphasized the clear distinction between tactical and strategic weapons, which can signal that Pyongyang will separate the delegative and assertive command and control models according to the type of nuclear capabilities in the near future.
참고문헌 (33)
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