Is Byungjin Policy Failing? Kim Jong Un’s Unannounced Reform and its Chances of Success
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The potential success of North Korea’s policy commonly known as “Byungjin (simultaneous advancement) Line,” is the topic of the present article. Since 2012, the new North Korean leadership has implemented a policy of Byungjin, which implies three major components: cautious market-oriented economic reforms, the development of a full-scale nuclear strike force, and maintenance of very strict surveillance and control systems domestically. It has been argued that the Byungjin policy cannot possibly succeed, but this article demonstrates that, so far, the policy has produced some notable results and delivered a measure of economic growth. This article further argues that the Byungjin policy has the potential of achieving a measure of long-term success, allowing Kim Jong Un and his system to survive for some time, maintaining both political stability and economic growth. It also argues that, given the peculiar international situation of North Korea, and other important variables, including Kim Jong Un’s age, the policy makes perfect sense—if judged from the perspective of the North Korean hereditary ruling elite. This article considers the problems Kim Jong Un’s model of authoritarian developmentalism will face and focuses on both de-stabilizing and stabilizing factors currently at work in North Korea. The article concludes that success of the Byungjin policy is possible, but will lead to a number of new challenges for the outside world.
Abstract
The potential success of North Korea’s policy commonly known as “Byungjin (simultaneous advancement) Line,” is the topic of the present article. Since 2012, the new North Korean leadership has implemented a policy of Byungjin, which implies three major components: cautious market-oriented economic reforms, the development of a full-scale nuclear strike force, and maintenance of very strict surveillance and control systems domestically. It has been argued that the Byungjin policy cannot possibly succeed, but this article demonstrates that, so far, the policy has produced some notable results and delivered a measure of economic growth. This article further argues that the Byungjin policy has the potential of achieving a measure of long-term success, allowing Kim Jong Un and his system to survive for some time, maintaining both political stability and economic growth. It also argues that, given the peculiar international situation of North Korea, and other important variables, including Kim Jong Un’s age, the policy makes perfect sense—if judged from the perspective of the North Korean hereditary ruling elite. This article considers the problems Kim Jong Un’s model of authoritarian developmentalism will face and focuses on both de-stabilizing and stabilizing factors currently at work in North Korea. The article concludes that success of the Byungjin policy is possible, but will lead to a number of new challenges for the outside world.
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