Taiwan’s Defense Strategy against China’s Amphibious Landing Operations: A Focus on Red Beaches
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The success of any Chinese invasion of Taiwan necessarily involves an amphibious landing operation on Taiwan’s beaches. The most vulnerable of these beaches have been referred to as “Red Beaches.” Despite the threat of China’s invasion of Taiwan garnering significant attention in recent years, little of this attention has been devoted to the questions of how Taiwan defends these critical Red Beaches and to what extent Taiwan’s Red Beach defensive strategy has evolved. Employing Lykke’s Ends-Ways-Means analytical framework, this paper seeks to answer these questions by examining Taiwan’s Red Beach defensive strategy during the Tsai Ingwen administration (2017–present). The main findings are that contrary to popular understanding, Taiwan’s defense strategy has undergone significant change entering Tsai’s second term. The range of Red Beach defensive operations has extended from the littoral zone to as far as Chinese territory, with the planned use of pre-emptive missile and air-to-ground strikes against “key nodes” of PLA forces. Together with the significantly increased role of Taiwan’s missile, naval and air force capabilities, Taiwan’s current Red Beach defense strategy can be characterized as having greater range, more integrated, and more offensive.
Abstract
The success of any Chinese invasion of Taiwan necessarily involves an amphibious landing operation on Taiwan’s beaches. The most vulnerable of these beaches have been referred to as “Red Beaches.” Despite the threat of China’s invasion of Taiwan garnering significant attention in recent years, little of this attention has been devoted to the questions of how Taiwan defends these critical Red Beaches and to what extent Taiwan’s Red Beach defensive strategy has evolved. Employing Lykke’s Ends-Ways-Means analytical framework, this paper seeks to answer these questions by examining Taiwan’s Red Beach defensive strategy during the Tsai Ingwen administration (2017–present). The main findings are that contrary to popular understanding, Taiwan’s defense strategy has undergone significant change entering Tsai’s second term. The range of Red Beach defensive operations has extended from the littoral zone to as far as Chinese territory, with the planned use of pre-emptive missile and air-to-ground strikes against “key nodes” of PLA forces. Together with the significantly increased role of Taiwan’s missile, naval and air force capabilities, Taiwan’s current Red Beach defense strategy can be characterized as having greater range, more integrated, and more offensive.
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