Behavioral Choices of Middle Powers in U.S.–China Strategic Competition: A Neoclassical Realism Perspective
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In the face of competition from great powers, the strategic choices that middle powers should make are a theoretical and practical issue that demands careful deliberation and in-depth research. In the post-Cold War era of U.S.–China strategic competition, the middle powers have adopted diverse strategies such as picking sides, hedging, and staying neutral. The behavioral choices of middle powers in the U.S.–China strategic competition are constrained not only by the intensity of U.S.– China competition and the type of dependence on the United States at the systemic level, but also by the strategic preferences of domestic policymakers and strategic elites. The intensity of U.S.–China competition and the dependency structures on great powers, as systemic factors, shape the range of behavioral choices for middle powers in the U.S.–China strategic competition. Meanwhile, domestic factors, acting as mediating variables, convey the directives issued by external structural variables, ultimately influencing and determining middle powers’ specific policies and behavioral patterns in the U.S.–China strategic competition. Canada, South Korea, and Argentina have chosen to pick a side, stay neutral, or hedge at different stages due to a combination of systemic and domestic factors, validating the core argument of this paper.
Abstract
In the face of competition from great powers, the strategic choices that middle powers should make are a theoretical and practical issue that demands careful deliberation and in-depth research. In the post-Cold War era of U.S.–China strategic competition, the middle powers have adopted diverse strategies such as picking sides, hedging, and staying neutral. The behavioral choices of middle powers in the U.S.–China strategic competition are constrained not only by the intensity of U.S.– China competition and the type of dependence on the United States at the systemic level, but also by the strategic preferences of domestic policymakers and strategic elites. The intensity of U.S.–China competition and the dependency structures on great powers, as systemic factors, shape the range of behavioral choices for middle powers in the U.S.–China strategic competition. Meanwhile, domestic factors, acting as mediating variables, convey the directives issued by external structural variables, ultimately influencing and determining middle powers’ specific policies and behavioral patterns in the U.S.–China strategic competition. Canada, South Korea, and Argentina have chosen to pick a side, stay neutral, or hedge at different stages due to a combination of systemic and domestic factors, validating the core argument of this paper.
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