早期儒家與天賦人權的問題

Abstract

This essay explores ways in which early Confucianism may help address theoretical challenges faced in moral philosophical discourse dominated by the liberalist idea that the concept of individual rights is central in understanding human dignity. The liberalist perspective conceptualizes the existence of individual rights as something to be ascertained through the individual who makes a claim when his rights are infringed. Consequently, freedom becomes a central, indispensible value with respect to human dignity. The theoretical challenge arises from the obvious incompatibility between freedom and other values significant for conceptualizing human rights, such as justice. Responses from scholars of Chinese philosophy to calls for comparative ethical inquiries, the initial question of which was always if Chinese philosophy developed the concept of individual rights, was two-fold. They acknowledged that the concept of individual rights as defined in liberalist moral philosophy was absent in Chinese intellectual tradition, but argued that human dignity could be articulated without it. They further argued that Chinese culture could offer a model of “duty-centered” and “community-centered” moral conduct. This essay argues that such a response, while bearing some measure of truth, shows insufficient understanding of early Confucian teachings. It proposes that the Dao as a metaphor inspires the idea of conduct that is “process-centered” than “goal-centered.” It also argues that the “self” can be both the subject and the object of the cultivation and control, and that can lead to a new, different function of the individual in the course of cultivating moral conduct.