A Confucian Deliberation on Rawls’s Liberal Conception of International Justice

Abstract

This paper is an attempt to look for a possible Confucian response to Rawls’s liberal conception of international justice in the Law of Peoples. In his effort to extend his liberal conception of international justice to non-liberal societies, Rawls contends that liberal peoples would tolerate decent peoples as good members of the society, and further believes that just principles agreed by liberal peoples can be extended to non-liberal but decent peoples. However, this contention poses a theoretical question whether decent peoples can accept the liberal principles of justice. Confucianism and Rawls’s political liberalism differ in their conceptions of person and society, and methods in seeking justice. Confucianism basically agrees to the principle of toleration and the guarantee of human rights. However, concerning some specifications of human rights addressed by Rawls, Confucianism would hold some reservation. However, Confucianism is also ambiguous like Rawls on the circumscription and the degree of intervention in sovereignty.