Aristotle on Eudaimonia

Abstract

There has been a long-standing controversy whether Aristotle's account of eudaimonia is 'inclusive' or 'dominant'. Book I of NE suggests that it includes elements of both types of account. The 'function' argument identifies it with 'activity in accordance with excellence, and if there are several excellences, in accordance with the best and the most teleion'(1098a16-18). I follow Kenny in interpreting the latter clause as 'in accordance with the best and most perfect' (of those excellences) against Ackrill's 'the best and most complete' (i.e. the most inclusive). Chapter 10 identifies eudaimonia with a complete life of perfect excellence accompanied with a sufficiency of external goods (1101a14-16). The conclusion of the function argument identifies the dominant element in the inclusive conception which is spelled out in ch. 10. The agent is to make the pursuit of excellence his/her dominant aim, but a wholly satisfactory life requires the possession of goods additional to excellence. Book X, chs. 6-8 identifies the most perfect excellence as excellent theōria that is the excellence by the exercise of which humans approach most closely to the divine life. But because humans are embodied being who require a social life, theōria must be exercised in a social context, which requires the virtues of character. The value of the latter is then subsidiary, but not wholly instrumental. The supreme value of human life consists in theōria, but that value is enhanced by the independent value of the social context in which it is lived. Aristotle's theory is indeterminate as to how theōria and virtue of character combine in the best life. That life must have theōria as its central focus, but that allows various possibilities, such as the life of a member of a philosophical community, or the life of a leisured citizen whose main interest is philosophy. Aristotle perhaps believes that there is no single form of the best life, but a variety of ways in which different individuals may live the kind of life that is best for them. It is a general feature of his ethics to state principles in outline form, leaving their particular application to the judgement of the agent. While this account is broadly consistent, there is a particular problem about the value of phronēsis. In VI.5 the goal of phronēsis is good conduct (eupraxia) which is chosen for its own sake, and the paradigm phronimoi are statesmen such as Pericles who discern what is good for themselves and others (1140b4-11). But in X theōria is valued above politics because only theōria is practised for its own sake, whereas politics is 'unleisured', undertaken for the sake of external goods such as the security and prosperity of the state (1177b1-24). The resolution of this problem is to be sought via clarification of the relative contributions of theōria and phronēsis to eudaimonia. Only theōria is chosen only for its own sake. Phronēsis is exercised both instrumentally, in the pursuit of external goods, and non-instrumentally, in the promotion of virtue of character, which in turn contributes to the best life both instrumentally, in the promotion of theōria, and non-instrumentally, via its own intrinsic, though subsidiary, value. There is no discrepancy between the account of the best life in NE X and that in the Politics. Both works defend the view that the best activity is theōria, and that the best life is a life focused on theōria, lived in a political context requiring the exercise of phronēsis and virtue of character. In neither work does Aristotle provide a detailed specification of how these elements combine to constitute the best life for the individual.