Rational Choice(prohairesis) and Wish(boulēsis) in Aristotle’s Ethics
0
조회
0
다운로드
0
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
This article discusses Aristotle’s rational choice(prohairesis). Rational choice is a core concept in that it can provide keys through which we can understand many vital concepts in his ethical theory. However, even with this importance, his comments regarding rational choice sometimes cause some confusion to his readers. We suggest that for us to understand the rational choice properly, it is necessary to scrutinize Aristotle’s discussions on related concepts, such as moral virtue, character, state and wish. Through this scrutinization, we propose that Aristotle’s rational choice is the particularization of wish. For, first of all, given that rational choice is also a sort of desire, among three desires Aristotle mentions wish is the only rational desire located in the rational part of the soul. Besides, the function of rational choice is to distinguish various moral characters well, and this is compatible with a property of wish in which it discriminates each agent’s moral character regarding one’s relationship to the good(agathon). To argue this, we first explain what the ‘apparent inconsistency’ in Aristotle’s comments is regarding rational choice and its related terms. Furthermore, we introduce the various positions of the scholars about the inconsistency in question. Finally, we give the conclusion by endorsing one of the positions and complementing it a bit.
Abstract
This article discusses Aristotle’s rational choice(prohairesis). Rational choice is a core concept in that it can provide keys through which we can understand many vital concepts in his ethical theory. However, even with this importance, his comments regarding rational choice sometimes cause some confusion to his readers. We suggest that for us to understand the rational choice properly, it is necessary to scrutinize Aristotle’s discussions on related concepts, such as moral virtue, character, state and wish. Through this scrutinization, we propose that Aristotle’s rational choice is the particularization of wish. For, first of all, given that rational choice is also a sort of desire, among three desires Aristotle mentions wish is the only rational desire located in the rational part of the soul. Besides, the function of rational choice is to distinguish various moral characters well, and this is compatible with a property of wish in which it discriminates each agent’s moral character regarding one’s relationship to the good(agathon). To argue this, we first explain what the ‘apparent inconsistency’ in Aristotle’s comments is regarding rational choice and its related terms. Furthermore, we introduce the various positions of the scholars about the inconsistency in question. Finally, we give the conclusion by endorsing one of the positions and complementing it a bit.
참고문헌 (17)
- Ackril, J.L., "Aristotle the Philosopher" (1981)
- Anscombe, G.E.M., "New Essays on Plato and Aristotle", pp.143~158 (1965)
- Bostock, David, "Aristotle’s Ethics" (2000)
- Broadie, S., "Ethics with Aristotle" (1991)
- Broadie, S, "Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics, translation, introduction and commentary" (2002)
- Bywater, I., "Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea" (1890)
- Charles, David, "Aristotle's Philosophy of Action" (1984)
- 전헌상, "소망과 품성-이성적 욕구와 영혼의 비이성적 상태들", 서양고전학연구, (21), pp.107~140 (2004), 한국서양고전학회
- Hughes, G.J., "Routledge Philsophy GuideBook to Aristotle on Ethics" (2003)
- Irwin, T. H., "Essays on Aristotle's Ethics", pp.117~156 (1980)
- Irwin, T. H., "Aristotle’s First Principles" (1988)
- Aristotle: translated, with introduction, notes, and glossary by Terrence Irwin, "Nicomachean Ethics", pp.1999, Irwin, T. H.
- 송유레, "아리스토텔레스의 ‘올바른 선택’: 성격적 덕과 실천적 지혜의 합작", 철학사상, (74), pp.99~130 (2019), 철학사상연구소[DOI]
- Kenny, A., "Aristotle’s Theory of the Will" (1979)
- Rackham, H., "Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics" (1926)
- Reeve, C.D., "Practices of Reason: Aristotle’s Nicomachean ethics" (1992)
- Ross, W.D., "Aristotle" (1923)