儒家思想에 있어서 超越性과 內在性의 문제 ­모종삼과 홀-에임즈의 담론과 관련하여

Abstract

From a viewpoint of moral philosophy, fundamental difference between Mou Tsung-san's transcendence claim and Hall and Ames' immanence claim lies in that Mou thinks that early Confucianism has something similar to transcendent law-giver or principle that justifies li(禮) and gives moral values to li, while Hall-Ames thinks that there is no such a thing. Hall-Ames' lack of transcendence claim seems not to be persuasive in the ethical point of view. It is because shu is a formal moral principle which justifies li. and shu is equivalent to Kant's categorical imperative in its implication. So, Shu is a transcendent moral principle which satisfies with Hall-Ames' condition of transcendence. Tien(天) in Confucianism is a transcendent entity in the sense that it is an ideal entity which makes moral judgment in accordance with such a transcendent moral principle. Therefore, modern Confucians' assertion of 'transcendent but immanent' is persuasive, because early Confucianism believes that sprouts of Tien's moral capacities are immanent in men. Finally, aspects of transcendence and that of immanence all exist in early Confucian moral thinking. Both aspects are in complementary relationship. So, lack of transcendent aspect is not desirable. The combination of both aspects is required for complete moral thinking.