본문 바로가기
KERD
논문KCI 등재

The Influence of Executive Overconfidence on Compensation－Performance Sensitivity Considering the Effects of COVID－19 and Ownership Structure：A Study of Chinese Enterprises

이찬호|류단단
한국세무회계학회 (Kata(Korean Association Of Tax & Accounting))|2024.09|세무회계연구 (Tax Accounting Research)|제81호|pp. 73-101

1

조회

0

다운로드

0

인용

0

참고문헌

키워드

경영자 과신성향COVID－19Executive OverconfidenceCompensation－Performance SensitivitySOEs/Non－SOEs성과 보상 민감도국유기업/비국유기업

초록

[Purpose] This paper investigates whether companies control overconfident executives by adjusting compensation－performance sensitivity to ensure positive contributions to corporate value. It also explores how the COVID－19 pandemic and differences in corporate ownership structure impact this relationship. [Methodology] This paper selects all A－share listed companies on the Chinese stock exchange from 2016 to 2021 as the research sample. It adopts Schrand and Zechman’s (2012) measure, which identifies overconfidence based on investment and financial decisions, to analyze the relationship between executive overconfidence and compensation－performance sensitivity. [Findings] First, there is a significant positive correlation between executive overconfidence and compensation－performance sensitivity. Second, the positive correlation between executive overconfidence and compensation－performance sensitivity existed only before COVID－19. Third, compared to SOEs, the positive relationship between executive overconfidence and compensation－performance sensitivity is more significant in Non－SOEs. [Implications] This paper shows that adjusting compensation－performance sensitivity is crucial for controlling overconfident executives and enhancing corporate governance. It is also the first to demonstrate that the impact of executive overconfidence on compensation－performance sensitivity varies with the effects of COVID－19. Additionally, it highlights the different strategies employed by SOEs and Non－SOEs in managing executive behavior, contributing to a nuanced understanding of governance across various enterprise types.

Abstract

[Purpose] This paper investigates whether companies control overconfident executives by adjusting compensation－performance sensitivity to ensure positive contributions to corporate value. It also explores how the COVID－19 pandemic and differences in corporate ownership structure impact this relationship. [Methodology] This paper selects all A－share listed companies on the Chinese stock exchange from 2016 to 2021 as the research sample. It adopts Schrand and Zechman’s (2012) measure, which identifies overconfidence based on investment and financial decisions, to analyze the relationship between executive overconfidence and compensation－performance sensitivity. [Findings] First, there is a significant positive correlation between executive overconfidence and compensation－performance sensitivity. Second, the positive correlation between executive overconfidence and compensation－performance sensitivity existed only before COVID－19. Third, compared to SOEs, the positive relationship between executive overconfidence and compensation－performance sensitivity is more significant in Non－SOEs. [Implications] This paper shows that adjusting compensation－performance sensitivity is crucial for controlling overconfident executives and enhancing corporate governance. It is also the first to demonstrate that the impact of executive overconfidence on compensation－performance sensitivity varies with the effects of COVID－19. Additionally, it highlights the different strategies employed by SOEs and Non－SOEs in managing executive behavior, contributing to a nuanced understanding of governance across various enterprise types.

참고문헌 (56)

  1. Ahmed, A. S., "Managerial overconfidence and accounting conservatism", Journal of Accounting Research, 51(1), pp.1~30 (2012)
  2. Baker, G. P., "Compensation and incentives : Practice vs. theory", The Journal of Finance, 43(3), pp.593~616 (1988)
  3. Managerial overconfidence and corporate policies, "Ben－David, I.", National Bureau of Economic Research, ~, pp.No. w13711 (2007)
  4. Boardman, A. E., "Ownership and performance in competitive environments : A comparison of the performance of private, mixed, and state－owned enterprises", Journal of Law and Economics, 32(1), pp.1~33 (1989)
  5. Campbell, J., "Have individual stocks become more volatile? An empirical exploration of idiosyncratic risk", Journal of Finance, 56(1), pp.1~43 (2001)
  6. Cheng, S., "R&D expenditures and CEO compensation", Accounting Review, 79(2), pp.305~328 (2004)
  7. Conyon, M. J., "Board control, remuneration committees, and top management compensation", Academy of Management Journal, 41(2), pp.146~157 (1998)
  8. Core, J. E., "Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance", Journal of Financial Economics, 51(3), pp.371~406 (1999)
  9. Cyert, R. M., "Corporate governance, takeovers, and top management compensation : Theory and evidence", Management Science, 48(4), pp.453~469 (2002)
  10. De Vito, A., "Estimating the COVID－19 cash crunch : Global evidence and policy", Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 39(2), pp.106741~ (2020)
  11. DeBondt, W. F. M., "Does the stock market overreact?", Journal of Finance, 40(3), pp.793~805 (1985)
  12. Dechow, P. M., "The effect of restructuring charges on executives’ cash compensation", The Accounting Review, 69(1), pp.138~156 (1994)
  13. Dechow, P. M., "Detecting earnings management", Accounting Review, pp.193~225 (1995)
  14. Hackbarth, D., "Managerial traits and capital structure decisions", Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 43(4), pp.843~881 (2008)
  15. Harvey, K. D., "Executive compensation structure and corporate governance choices", Journal of Financial Research, 24(4), pp.495~512 (2001)
  16. Hassan, M. K., "Challenges for the Islamic finance and banking in post COVID era and the role of Fintech", Journal of Economic Cooperation & Development, 41(3), pp.93~116 (2020)
  17. Hayward, M. L., "Explaining the premiums paid for large acquisitions：Evidence of CEO hubris", Administrative Science Quarterly, pp.103~127 (1997)
  18. Heaton, J. B., "Managerial optimism and corporate finance", Financial Management, 31(2), pp.33~45 (2002)
  19. Huang, Y., "Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics：Entrepreneurship and the State" (2008), Cambridge University Press
  20. Jensen, M. C., "Performance pay and top management incentives", Journal of Political Economy, 98(2), pp.225~264 (1990)
  21. Jensen, M. C., "Theory of the firm : Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure", Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), pp.305~360 (1976)
  22. Keiber, K. L, "Managerial compensation contracts and overconfidence", ~ (2002)
  23. Lambert, R. A., "An analysis of the use of accounting and market measures of performance in executive compensation contracts", Journal of Accounting Research, pp.85~125 (1987)
  24. Langer, E. J., "The illusion of control", Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 32(2), pp.311~328 (1975)
  25. Lee, J. W., "Cross－national differences in overconfidence", Asian Journal of Psychology, 1(2), pp.63~69 (1995)
  26. Li, J., "CEO hubris and firm risk taking in China : The moderating role of managerial discretion", Academy of Management Journal, 53(1), pp.45~68 (2010)
  27. Malmendier, U., "CEO overconfidence and corporate investment", The Journal of Finance, 60(6), pp.2661~2700 (2005)
  28. Murthy, K. R., "Should CEO pay be linked to results?", Harvard Business Review, 53(3), pp.66~73 (1975)
  29. Nee, V., "Capitalism from Below：Markets and Institutional Change in China" (2012), Harvard University Press
  30. Richardson, S., "Over－investment of free cash flow", Review of Accounting Studies, 11, pp.159~189 (2006)
  31. Roll, R., "The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers", Journal of Business, 59, pp.197~216 (1986)
  32. Schrand, C. M., "Executive overconfidence and the slippery slope to financial misreporting", Journal of Accounting and Economics, 53(1-2), pp.311~329 (2012)
  33. Sloan, R. G., "Accounting earnings and top executive compensation", Journal of Accounting and Economics, 16(1-3), pp.55~100 (1993)
  34. Tang, Y., "Does founder CEO status affect firm risk taking?", Journal of Leadership and Organizational Studies, 23(3), pp.322~334 (2016)
  35. Yermack, D., "Do corporations award CEO stock options effectively?", Journal of Financial Economics, 40(2), pp.237~269 (1995)
  36. 高淑娟, "债务约束、管理层过度自信与投资效率", 重庆文理学院学报(社会科学版), (3), pp.65~77 (2021)
  37. 唐任伍, "新冠病毒肺炎疫情对中国经济发展的损害及应对措施", 经济与管理研究, 41(05), pp.3~13 (2020)
  38. 刘建秋, "“论资排辈”式高管薪酬与企业生产效率研究", 南开管理评论, 24(1), pp.118~126 (2021)
  39. 李伟, "儒家文化, 管理层过度自信与投资过度", 会计之友, 19, pp.56~62 (2020)
  40. 傅强, "管理者过度自信与并购决策的实证研究", 商业经济与管理, 4, pp.76~80 (2014)
  41. 吴锋, "COVID－19 疫情对中国区域经济及产业的影响", 地理学报, 76(04), pp.1034~1048 (2021)
  42. 王勇, "由新冠疫情引发的对宏观经济学建模的思考", 经济评论, 4, pp.41~45 (2020)
  43. 张丽平, "管理者权力, 内部薪酬差距与公司价值", 经济与管理研究, 5, pp.5~17 (2013)
  44. 曹晨, "经济政策不确定性对高管薪资绩效敏感性的影响. 重庆文理学院学报(社会科学版), No. 2", 重庆文理学院学报(社会科学版), (2), pp.120~128 (2023)
  45. 朱武琴, "我国独立董事与高管薪酬的实证研究——基于中小板上市公司数据. 重庆文理学院学报(社会科学版), No. 2", 重庆文理学院学报(社会科学版), (2), pp.24~32 (2020)
  46. 肖继辉, "基于不同股权特征的上市公司经理报酬业绩敏感性", 南开管理评论, 3, pp.18~24 (2005)
  47. 肖继辉, "上市公司总经理报酬业绩敏感性研究", 财经研究, 30(12), pp.34~44 (2004)
  48. 贺勇, "高管过度自信、过度投资与企业价值——基于暴风集团的案例", 财会通讯, (06), pp.94~103 (2024)
  49. 叶玲, "管理者过度自信, 企业投资与企业绩效－－基于我国Ａ股上市公司的实证检验", 山西财经大学学报, 35(1), pp.116~124 (2013)
  50. 洪昀, "融资融券与高管薪酬契约有效性研究", 科研管理, (4), pp.229~238 (2020)
  51. 김현진, "경영자 재량권과 개인별 보상을 이용한 성과－보상 민감도", 대한경영학회지, 30(2), pp.203~229 (2017)
  52. 박종훈, "최고경영자 자기과신과 기업성과：이사회와 재벌의 조절효과", 경영학연구, 42(3), pp.673~697 (2013)
  53. 안유연, "최고경영자의 자기과신 성향과 성과－보상 민감도", 회계저널, 32(2), pp.151~182 (2023)
  54. 정훈, "성과와 비대칭적 성과보상민감도", 경영학연구, 43(5), pp.1557~1594 (2014)
  55. 지성권, "자본구조가 경영자 성과－보상 민감도에 미치는 영향", 관리회계연구, 9(2), pp.1~30 (2009)
  56. 지성권, "기업 성과에 대한 경영자 보상 민감도", 한국회계학회 학술발표논문집, 1, pp.1~22 (2006)

관련 논문AI추천

The Effect of Overconfident Managers on Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity백인영, 이은서, 마리아 리치경영경제연구소 · 경영경제연구2024 · 제46권 제3호Executive Compensation, Ownership Structureand Firm Performance in Chinese Financial CorporationsDave O.Jackson, Yongli Luo사람과세계경영학회 · Global Business and Finance Review2012 · 제17권 제1호公司治理对高管薪酬与企业绩效关联度的影响研究 ——以中国上市公司为对象김춘수, 장지화한국국제회계학회 · 국제회계연구2015 · 제63호Analysis of the Recent Research Trends on Executive Compensation: Comparison between South Korea and ChinaDong Sirui, Jia Zhong, Jiyeon Lee, Youn－Sik Choi한국국제회계학회 · 국제회계연구2024 · 제115호Managerial Overconfidence and Firm Value정경화, 한길석, Yu Gao경영경제연구소 · 아태비즈니스연구2021 · 제12권 제3호The Effect of COVID-19 on the CEO Compensations: From the Perspective of ESG Management김수인, 김인중, 허진숙한국금융공학회 · 金融工學硏究2023 · 제22권 제4호

이 간행물의 다른 논문 (10건)

사립대학의 특성이 재정건전성에 미치는 영향김영화pp. 1-16Does Korea’s Seminal Audit Reform Improve Audit Quality?김효진, Charles R. Pryor, 윤순석pp. 17-48세무대리인의 전문성 및 세무대리서비스 품질과 고객만족, 그리고 계속이용의사이찬호, 최태한pp. 49-72주기적지정기업의 시간당 감사보수에 따른 감사품질박현영, 조은정, 정주렴pp. 103-123기업지배구조를 고려한 ESG 위원회와 신용등급간의 관련성김새로나, 최준혁pp. 125-168
원문 보기