종업원 재량권과 성과보상이 생산성에 미치는 영향
The Effect of Employee Discretion and Performance Pay on the Productivity
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본 연구는 종업원 재량권과 성과보상 사이의 관계를 규명한다. 이를 위해 종업원 재량권에 대한 결정요인을 규명하고 기업특성에 따른 종업원 재량권이 성과보상에 미치는 영향을 분석함으로써 종업원 재량권과 통제 메카니즘으로써의 유인보상에 대한 직접적인 관계를 분석한다. 또한 종업원 재량권과 이에 따른 적절한 통제장치로써의 유인보상계약의 적합성이 높을수록 조직의 생산성이 향상되어 지는지에 대해서 분석한다. 분석결과, 종업원 재량권은 직무가 복잡하고, 유기적인 조직일수록 그리고 종업원 개인적 학력수준과 조직에서의 근속연수가 높을수록 증가하는 것으로 나타났다. 또한 직무복잡성, 유기적 조직 그리고 개인적 특성에 의해 설명되어진 종업원 재량권이 증가 할수록 유인보상계약으로써의 성과보상이 증가하는 것으로 나타났다. 이상의 결과를 종합하면, 기업의 내․외부 환경에 대한 불확실성이 증가할수록 경영자는 종업원의 직무활동에 대한 재량권을 보다 많이 부여한다. 그리고 종업원이 부여받을 재량권을 남용할 경우, 발생될 수 있는 대리문제를 완화하기 위해 경영자는 종업원들에게 보다 많은 성과보상을 지급하는 것으로 분석되었다. 마지막으로, 종업원 재량권과 성과보상의 적합성이 조직의 생산성에 미치는 영향을 분석한 결과, 종업원의 재량권 수준과 성과보상 사이의 적합성이 높을수록 기업의 노동생산성이 보다 높은 것으로 분석되었다.
Abstract
The purpose of this study is to find out the several factors affect employee discretion, and then to analyze that employee discretion determined endogenously by these ones has an effect on the performance pay. Moreover this paper examines that labour productivity in the firm increases when the fitness between the employ discretion and performance pay is high. The data is drawn from the Workplace Panel Survey Data conducted in 2007 by Korea Labor Institute, and consists of 180 domestic manufacturing companies. The results are as follows:First, firm-level characteristics such as job complexity and organic organization and personal-level characteristics like the level of education and tenure of the employee are significant and positive relationships with the employee discretion. Furthermore, as employee discretion determined endogenously by those characteristics increases, performance pay also rises. Second, to investigate the effects of the fitness between employee discretion and performance pay on the labour productivity, we classified the variables for employee discretion and performance pay as three groups according to size. The results shows that the group with higher level of employee discretion and performance pay is associated with higher productivity compared to the other groups.
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