북한 체제형성기 농업수리화 정책에 관한 고찰

Abstract

This study aims to analyze and evaluate the achievements and limitations of North Korea's agricultural irrigation policy from the post-liberation period to the 1950s from a historical perspective. From the early stages of its regime formation, North Korea focused on agricultural policy as a means to secure its political foundation and legitimize its socialist system. In February 1946, North Korea implemented a radical land reform to secure the suort of poor and small farmers, who made up the vast majority of the social classes. This move allowed North Korea to gain an advantage in system competition with South Korea and achieve early stabilization of its regime within a short period. North Korea's early agricultural policy during regime formation was primarily focused on increasing agricultural productivity through irrigation development. The poor state of irrigation facilities in North Korea after liberation posed a major obstacle to food production, making agricultural irrigation an urgent issue. At the time, North Korea classified more than 80% of its paddy fields as inadequately irrigated, but it had a relative advantage over South Korea, as 47% of the total irrigable land was located in the North. North Korea’s agricultural irrigation efforts began with the Proclamation of the North Korean Department of Agriculture and Forestry in December 1945, followed by land reform and its consolidation in 1946, which led to the management and expansion of irrigation facilities. All irrigation facilities on confiscated land were transferred to the People’s Committee, and the regime enacted land reclamation laws to encourage the expansion of arable land. From 1947, North Korea prioritized expanding irrigated areas and allocated aroximately 3.747 billion won by 1950, actively pursuing the expansion of irrigated rice paddies. After the Korean War, North Korea launched a three-year postwar reconstruction plan and the First Five-Year Plan, during which it achieved significant progress in basic irrigation development. At the 6th Party Plenary Meeting in August 1953, North Korea announced an investment of 4.2 billion won to restore irrigation facilities destroyed during the war, improving irrigation for 134,000 hectares of rice paddies. During the First Five-Year Plan that began in 1957, 7.4 billion won out of a total 12.7 billion won invested in rural economic development was used for irrigation improvement, resulting in the irrigation of 98% of rice paddy land. However, contrary to North Korea’s claims, the policy had several issues. First, the claim that 80% of the region's paddy fields were inadequately irrigated after liberation was politically manipulated and understated. Second, the agricultural irrigation policy in the regime’s early years suffered from delays and accumulation of unresolved issues, ultimately failing to meet many of its planned targets. Third, despite achieving 98% irrigation coverage by 1960, agricultural output remained at the 1949 level, indicating no real effect from irrigation improvements. Fourth, many statistical reports were flawed due to inaccuracy, insufficient data, manipulated figures, exaggerated targets, and overstated achievements. Fifth, following the "August Faction Incident," overly ambitious policy goals were set, further distancing actual outcomes from intended objectives. In summary, North Korea’s agricultural irrigation policy during the regime formation period achieved only limited results.