Privatization Initial Public Offerings and Optimal Stake Sold
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This research deals with the undecided controversial question, “Does ownership matter?” I derive a model based on the theory of information asymmetry, which explains the optimal stake sold of shares in privatization. The model implies that stake sold at the initial public offerings (IPOs) of privatized stake-owned enterprise (SOEs) are strategic device employed by issuers to signal their commitment on policy uncertainty. Abundant empirical findings tend to be consistent with the predictions of the model derived in this paper. The stake sold at the IPOs is positively related to the degree of uncertainty in the ex anti value of the newly privatized firms. Empirical findings in this research show that the high long-run profitability of privatized can be explained by the policy uncertainty. The long run outperformance of privatization IPOs seems to be the result of the revision of insiders’ beliefs about policy uncertainty. As reputation about commitment of the governments improves, managers in the privatized firm revise their beliefs about possible redistribution of firm value and exert effort to maximize the value of the firm.
Abstract
This research deals with the undecided controversial question, “Does ownership matter?” I derive a model based on the theory of information asymmetry, which explains the optimal stake sold of shares in privatization. The model implies that stake sold at the initial public offerings (IPOs) of privatized stake-owned enterprise (SOEs) are strategic device employed by issuers to signal their commitment on policy uncertainty. Abundant empirical findings tend to be consistent with the predictions of the model derived in this paper. The stake sold at the IPOs is positively related to the degree of uncertainty in the ex anti value of the newly privatized firms. Empirical findings in this research show that the high long-run profitability of privatized can be explained by the policy uncertainty. The long run outperformance of privatization IPOs seems to be the result of the revision of insiders’ beliefs about policy uncertainty. As reputation about commitment of the governments improves, managers in the privatized firm revise their beliefs about possible redistribution of firm value and exert effort to maximize the value of the firm.
참고문헌 (18)
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