The Asymmetric Investment Game Strategy Utilizing R&D incentives with Patent
2
조회
0
다운로드
0
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
This paper examines asymmetric R&D investment decision strategies with patent for two competing firms. Our focus is placed on establishing cost functions with varying investment costs for competing firms. In particular, we consider a strategic decision making process for these firms where one is with a relatively higher brand image or cost functions and the other with low investment cost through non-infringing imitation. In this study, we develop a strategic competition model through game theory. Our findings are as follows: (1)If non-infringing imitation is less likely, bilateral R&D competition under patent protection tends to create higher strategic R&D incentives for R&D cooperation than independent R&D investment. (2)Under patent protection, technology licensing creates higher R&D incentives for both firms when compared with the without-licensing situations.
Abstract
This paper examines asymmetric R&D investment decision strategies with patent for two competing firms. Our focus is placed on establishing cost functions with varying investment costs for competing firms. In particular, we consider a strategic decision making process for these firms where one is with a relatively higher brand image or cost functions and the other with low investment cost through non-infringing imitation. In this study, we develop a strategic competition model through game theory. Our findings are as follows: (1)If non-infringing imitation is less likely, bilateral R&D competition under patent protection tends to create higher strategic R&D incentives for R&D cooperation than independent R&D investment. (2)Under patent protection, technology licensing creates higher R&D incentives for both firms when compared with the without-licensing situations.
참고문헌 (32)
- Arora, A., "R&D and the patent premium", International Journal of Industrial Organization, 26, pp.1153~1179 (2008)
- Che, X., "Patent protection with a cooperative R&D option", Economics Letters, 116, pp.469~471 (2012)
- Protecting Their Intellectual Assets:Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not), "Cohen, W. M.", National Bureau of Economic Research, 1~50, pp.Working Paper No. W7552 (2000)
- Dixit, A., "Investment under uncertainty" (1994), Princeton University Press
- Fershtman, C., "Patents, imitation and licensing in an asymmetric dynamic R&D race", International Journal of Industrial Organization, 28, pp.113~126 (2010)
- Hall, B. H., "The patent paradox revisited: an empirical study of patenting in the U.S. semiconductor industry, 1979-1995 Bronwyn", Rand Journal of Economics, 32(1), pp.101~128 (2001)
- Hall, B., "Does the market value R&D investment by European firms? Evidence from a panel of manufacturing firms in France, Germany, and Italy", International Journal of Industrial Organization, 24, pp.971~993 (2006)
- Huisman, K., "Strategic technology investment under uncertainty", OR Spectrum, 24(1), pp.79~98 (2002)
- Huisman, K., "Strategic investment in technological innovations", European Journal of Operational Research, 144(1), pp.209~223 (2003)
- Huisman, K., "Strategic Investment under Uncertainty : Merging Real Options with Game Theory", Zeitschrift fur Betriebswissenschaft, 3, pp.97~123 (2004)
- Levin, R. C., "Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development", Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3, pp.783~820 (1987)
- Li, D., "Financial Constraints, R&D Investment, and Stock Returns", The Review of Financial Studies, 24(9), pp.2974~3007 (2011)
- Lim, W., "Multistage R&D competition and patent policy", Journal of Economics, 68(2), pp.153~173 (1998)
- Martzoukos, S, "Real option games with R&D and learning spillovers", Omega, 41, pp.236~249 (2013)
- Matutes, C., "Optimal Patent Protection and the Diffusion of Innovation", Rand Journal of Economics, 27, pp.60~83 (1996)
- Miyagiwa, K., "Uncertainty, spillovers, and cooperative R&D", International Journal of Industrial Organization, 20, pp.855~876 (2002)
- Mukherjee, A., "Patents and R&D with imitation and licensing", Economics Letters, 93(2), pp.196~201 (2006)
- Pakes, A., "Patents as Options : Some Estimates of the Value of Holding European Patent Stocks", Econometrica, 54, pp.755~784 (1986)
- Pawlina, G., "Real Options in an Asymmetric Duopoly : Who Benefits from Your Competitive Disadvantage?", Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 15(1), pp.1~35 (2006)
- Perry, M., "The Optimal Timing of Procurement Decisions and Patent Allocations", International Economic Review, 43, pp.1035~1052 (2002)
- Reinganum, J. F., "Dynamic games of innovation", Journal of Economic Theory, 25, pp.21~41 (1981)
- Reinganum, J. F., "A Dynamic Game of R&D : Patent Protection and Competitive Behaviour", Econometrica, 50, pp.671~688 (1982)
- Reinganum, J. F., "Handbook of Industrial Organization, 1", pp.850~905 (1989)
- Roberts, P. W., "Innovation and Firm-Level Persistent Profitability : A Schumpeterian Framework", Managerial and Decision Economics, 22, pp.239~250 (2001)
- Roy Chowdhury, P., "Patents and R&D : the tournament effect", Economics Letters, 89, pp.120~126 (2005)
- Schwartz, E., "Patents and R&D as Real Options", Economic Notes: Review of Banking, Finance and Monetary Economics, 33(1), pp.23~54 (2004)
- Smit, H., "A real options and game-theoretic approach to corporate investment strategy under competition", Financial Management, 22(3), pp.241~259 (1993)
- Smit, H., "Real options and games: Competition, alliances and other applications of valuation and strategy", Review of Financial Economics (2006)
- Smit, H., "Strategic options and games in analyzing dynamic technology investments", Long Range Planning, 40, pp.84~114 (2007)
- Weeds, H., "Sleeping patents and compulsory licensing: An options analysis", Warwick economics research paper, 579~ (2000)
- Weeds, H., "Strategic Delay in a Real Options Model of R & D Competition", Review of Economic Studies, 69(3), pp.729~747 (2002)
- Zhang, H., "Experimental Research on Asymmetric R&D Investment of R&D", Product Problem, 2012, pp.2, 83~86