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Patent Thicket, Secrecy, and Licensing

권일웅
한국경제학회 (The Korean Economic Association)|2012.06|The Korean Economic Review|제28권 제1호|pp. 27-49|DOI http://dx.doi.org/

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참고문헌

키워드

LicensingSecrecyPatent Thicket
주제분류경제학

초록

This paper considers a patent portfolio race where firms compete for complementary patents, called a patent thicket. When firms have an option to keep their innovation secret,this paper shows that there exists an equilibrium where firms’ patent propensity is strictly between zero and one. In such an equilibrium, stronger patent protection reduces the firms’investment in innovation. Moreover, this result does not change even when a licensing contract is feasible.

Abstract

This paper considers a patent portfolio race where firms compete for complementary patents, called a patent thicket. When firms have an option to keep their innovation secret,this paper shows that there exists an equilibrium where firms’ patent propensity is strictly between zero and one. In such an equilibrium, stronger patent protection reduces the firms’investment in innovation. Moreover, this result does not change even when a licensing contract is feasible.

참고문헌 (23)

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