화두와 메타적 반성

Abstract

The main aim of this article is to show the endorsement of ‘meta-reflection’ as an ideological and methodological similarity between Ganhwa Seon and Indian Madhyamaka by comparing the role of ‘doubt’ in the Hwadu (critical phrase or keyword 話頭) with the ‘intellectual negation’ (pratiṣedha). Consequently, this article highlights the identity of the Korean Ganhwa Seon through differentiating it from a feature of Zen Buddhism which neglects the importance of the function of ‘doubt’ in the context of the Hwadu through the process of a cognitive approach. To do this, I observe a commonality between the three thoughts: the Ganhwa Seon, L. Wittgenstein, and Indian Madhyamaka. In order for the West to understand the Ganhwa Seon, one of the methodologies is to compare it with L. Wittgenstein, furthermore, there is a comparison of ideas between Wittgenstein to the Indian Madhyamaka. This is done in three stages. First, I explore the later Wittgenstein's philosophy that the metaphysical existence beyond our experience was just our request through overcoming the philosophical limitations of the former Wittgenstein’s view. Even he had tried to explore the new existentialism by ensuring the philosophy of healing from his former philosophy, but he finally realized that the objectivist settings are our demand after moving on later Wittgenstein's perspective. That is, it is pseudo-existence, which is not really real, and it is a projection of our hopes. To eliminate this pseudo-existence requires us to question what we know. The later Wittgenstein's philosophy is reformed by breaking down the objectivism that had restrained him through such distrusts and philosophical inquiries. His later philosophy began with questioning our perception of everyday languages, similar to the approach pursued by the Ganhwa Seon and the Indian Madhyamaka. In fact, by doing this, the Ganhwa Seon and the Indian Madhyamaka seek to apply the ‘strong cluster of doubts and intellectual negations’. The reason for this is to see the foundational falseness of existence, based on the Buddhist epistemology tradition. Next, I draw a parallel between the later Wittgenstein's perspectives according to philosophical Investigations and the Indian Madhyamaka’s thoughts. As if Wittgenstein's later philosophy has led modern philosophy to the path of an ontology without foundationalism, the Indian Madhyamaka did not seek for metaphysical ontology. The Madhyamaka had known that the end of ontology is just one extreme, not the pursuit of epistemological exploration. Hence this shows that the starting point of Buddhist epistemology is inherently different than any other Western philosophical tradition, to demolish all kinds of pseudo-existence, in which the ‘cluster of doubts’ and the ‘intellectual negation’ about the existence are needed. Finally, the Indian Madhyamaka's method of thinking through the ‘intellectual negation’ and the role of ‘doubt’ in the Hwadu are explored in terms of ‘meta-reflection’. This investigation is focused on aspects to correct our cognitive misunderstandings or eccentric cognitive attitudes. In order to reveal it, I try to compare the functional aspects of the questioning in the Hwadu with verbally bound negation of the Indian Madhyamaka's. Therefore, I show that the ultimate goal of the Indian Madhyamaka's method and the Hwadu is the same in regard to leading one to the same cognitive perspective.