유럽 디지털시장법(Digital Markets Act): 목적, 기본원리와 접근방법을 중심으로
The EU Digital Markets Act Focusing on its Objectives, Principles and Approach
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온라인플랫폼의 규제방식을 둘러싼 논쟁은 과연 빅테크가 보유한 힘이 얼마나 새로운 현상인지, 그리고 설사 과거와 전혀 다른 새로운 힘이라고 하더라도 이를 규율할 장치 또한 얼마나 새로운 것이어야 하는지에 관한 인식의 차이에서 비롯된다. 이러한 맥락에서 DMA는 빅테크의 새로운 힘에 대해서 종전과 다른 새로운 규제체계가 필요하다는 인식을 기초로 삼고 있다. 그렇게 제정된 DMA는 그 성질상 일반경쟁법과 특별한 산업규제의 중간 어디에 위치하고 있을 것이다. 유럽의 경쟁법이 거대플랫폼의 ʻ집중ʼ 문제를 규율하기에 부적합하다는 믿음이 DMA의 기초설계를 이루고 있기 때문이다. DMA의 성격은 대체로 경쟁법을 보충하는 수단이라고 이해할 수 있으며, 구체적인 내용 면에서는 빅테크에 대한 ʻ혁신적ʼ 규제라기보다는 전통적인 경제규제에 가깝다. DMA는 경쟁법에서 착안한 방식으로 나름 빅테크의 고유한 특성과 경쟁제한적 행태에 맞는 규제체계를 갖추고 있으나, 개별 사안마다 경쟁제한성을 따지는 사례별 접근방법을 탈피하고 있다. 이 점에서 DMA는 개별 사안마다 구체적 타당성을 추구하는 탄력적인 기준보다는 법집행의 용이함을 일차로 염두에 둔 다분히 경직된 기준을 채용하고 있다. 경쟁법이 다른 법영역에 비하여 태생적으로 사후규제에 기초한 유연성을 갖고 있는 점과 본질적으로 다른 부분이다. 그 기저에는 게이트키퍼가 존재하는 시장에 인위적이면서 보다 급진적인 방식으로 신속하게 경쟁을 형성할 수 있다는 인식이 자리잡고 있다. 그런데 과연 플랫폼시장이 그렇게 관리가능한지는 의문이며, 경쟁법은 과거 오랫동안 시장의 변화에 맞게 변화·개선되어 왔다는 점을 간과해서는 안 된다. 이제 보다 근본적인 변화는 디지털경제 하에서 경쟁법·정책의 방법론이 혁신과 동태적 경쟁을 중시하고 플랫폼의 혁신잠재력을 강조하는 방향으로 전환되는 것에서 출발하여야 한다. DMA는 이러한 방향과는 다른 해법을 찾고 있다는 점에서 유럽의 위태로운 미래를 암시한다. 무릇 올바른 해법을 찾기 위해서는 문제에 대한 올바른 진단이 선행되어야 한다. 온라인플랫폼과 관련해서도 출발점은 핵심플랫폼서비스의 경우 불가피하게 독점화 추세가 나타날 수밖에 없는지, 플랫폼시장에서 혁신과 경쟁을 촉진하기 위하여 불가피하게 사전지정 및 당연위법식 규제가 필요할 만큼 다른 방법으로는 독점화를 해소할 수 없는지에 대한 면밀한 진단이다. 아울러 모든 규제법이 그러하듯 플랫폼규제법 또한 그 목표와 수단의 정합성이 이루어져야 한다. 무엇보다 디지털경제의 발전과 혁신을 저해하지 않으면서 자유·공정경쟁에 긍정적인 효과를 가져올 수 있는 규제법이어야 한다. 충분한 고민 없이 급조된 특별법이 당초 취지를 달성하기란 불가능한 일이고, 나아가 경쟁상황에 맞지 않는 규제는 유효경쟁은 커녕 플랫폼산업의 발전에 충분히 예측가능한 부작용을 야기할 것이다. 빠르게 변화·발전하는 디지털시장의 특성을 감안할 때 공정거래법은 매우 탄력적이고 유연한 기준으로 대응하기에 부족함이 없다. DMA 자체가 전례를 찾기 어려운 유럽식 접근방식이라는 점, 핵심플랫폼서비스 및 게이트키퍼라는 극소수의 빅테크만을 규제대상으로 삼고 있는 점 등에 비추어 볼 때 국내 플랫폼서비스에 관한 경쟁분석도 없는 상태에서 특별법 제정을 서두르는 것은 아무도 그것이 장래에 미칠 영향을 알 수 없다는 의미에서 다분히 실험적이다.
Abstract
The debate over how online platforms should be regulated stems from a difference in perceptions of how new the power of big tech is, and how new the mechanisms to regulate it should be, even if it is a new power that is completely different from the past. In this context, the DMA is based on the recognition that the new power of big tech requires a new regulatory system that is different from the past. The DMA would, by its very nature, be somewhere between general competition law and special industry regulation. This is echoed by Margrethe Vestager, the European Commissioner for Competition, who said ʻʻWe also want to build better digital markets and the Digital Markets Act is a good example of the way in which competition law and regulation can complement each other to keep markets open.ʼʼ The DMA is based on the belief that European competition law is inadequate to address the problem of ʻʻconcentrationʼʼ of giant platforms. The nature of the DMA is broadly understood as a supplement to competition law. While the DMA has a regulatory system that is tailored to the unique characteristics and anti-competitive behavior of big tech in a way that is inspired by the competition law, it departs from the case-by-case approach of determining the anti-competitive nature of each individual case. In this regard, the DMA adopts a rather rigid standard that is primarily concerned with ease of law enforcement rather than a flexible standard that seeks specific justification for each individual case. This is where competition law differs from other areas of law in that it is inherently flexible and based on ex post regulation. Underlying the DMA is the recognition that markets with gatekeepers can quickly create competition in an artificial and more radical way. However, it is questionable whether platform markets are so manageable, and it should not be overlooked that competition law has a long history of adapting and improving to market changes. A more fundamental change should start with a shift in the methodology of competition law and policy in the digital economy to emphasize innovation, dynamic competition, and the innovative potential of platforms. The fact that the DMA is looking for a solution that is not in this direction suggests a precarious future for Europe. In order to find the right solution, the right diagnosis of the problem must be made. In the case of online platforms, the starting point is a careful assessment of whether there is an inevitable trend towards monopolization of core platform services, and whether the monopolization cannot be eliminated by other means to the extent that pre-designation and de jure regulation is necessary to promote innovation and competition in the platform market. Above all, it should be a regulatory law that can have a positive effect on free and fair competition without hindering the development and innovation of the digital economy. It is impossible to achieve the original purpose of a special law that has been hastily enacted without sufficient consideration, and furthermore, regulations that are not adapted to the competitive situation will cause adverse effects on the development of the platform industry, let alone effective competition. Given the rapidly changing and evolving nature of the digital marketplace, antitrust laws are highly resilient and flexible enough to respond. Given that the DMA itself is a European approach with no precedent, and that it regulates only a few big tech companies that provide core platform services and gatekeepers, rushing to enact a special law without a competition analysis of domestic platform services is highly experimental in the sense that no one knows the impact it will have in the future.
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