임원배상책임보험과 화해

Abstract

Recently, discussions have been conducted on the issue that the effect of suppressing directors' illegal activities is reduced by executive liability insurance or interpretation of the terms and conditions of executive liability insurance. This paper is about the effect of executive liability insurance on reconciliation, a problem that has not been reviewed so far, and discussions were conducted with reference to theoretical and empirical studies in the United States. In the case of the United States, it was found that the existence of executive liability insurance affects the judgment of the litigant, the timing of reconciliation, and the amount of reconciliation. In some cases, executive liability insurance may lead to undesirable reconciliation from the perspective of shareholder interests and the problem of lowering the inhibitory effect. It is pointed out that insurance companies have incentives to fight against undesirable reconciliation, but due to various restrictions such as responsibility for settlement at the reconciliation stage, insurance companies cannot resist such undesirable reconciliation. In the U.S. theory, it is proposed to start the reconciliation and set a higher risk acquisition ratio for joint reinsurance of corporate collateral to solve the problem of undesirable reconciliation caused by executive liability insurance. In other words, considering the content of reconciliation and the compensation limit and insurance structure of executive liability insurance, data that can interpret the meaning of reconciliation, such as merit of reconciliation or whether the Defendant committed an illegal act, are obtained. In addition, by setting a high share ratio in the corporate collateral clause, the incentive for the company to monitor the behavior of the manager and the incentive to suppress the settlement of securities litigation to reflect merit increases.