일상세계의 근원적 규범성과 공감

Abstract

Heidegger’s ontology has two limitations on its capacity to explain concrete meanings of Dasein’s existence. First, it has no argumentation of the concrete existential relationship between authentic Daseins. Second, it has no argumentation of the ethical relationship between authentic or inauthentic Daseins. In order to overcome these limitations, we need to think about two things: the ontological meaning of sympathy on the one hand, and the ontological meaning of the fundamental normativity of the everyday world on the other hand. According to Heidegger, death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Da-sein. Thus death reveals itself as the ownmost nonrelational possibility not to be bypassed. Roughly speaking, Dasein’s being as being towards death reveals that Dasein’s authentic existence cannot be reduced to the being-in-the-everyday-world. Out of this two questions arise. First, what is the ontological meaning of authetic Dasein’s being-with-others? Does death reveal that authentic Dasein is not truly being with others because being-with-others is a way of existence in the everyday world? Second, what is the ontological meaning of ethical norms for Dasein? Does death as the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Da-sein insinuate that authentic Dasein originally has no ethical relationship with others because ethical norms are for the living in the everyday world? Is it ontologically possible to define authentic Dasein’s being as being-with-others if ethical norms are for the living in the everyday world? In order to answer these questions, we need to clarify ontological meanings of sympathy between Daseins and of normativity of the everyday world.