전후초기 중국 동북지역 적산처리를 둘러싼 중미소의 갈등

Abstract

US president Roosevelt promised the condition of sending a military expedition under the Yalta Pact and Chinese president Chaing Kai-shek approved most of the provisions of the Pact through the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance. However, the government of the Republic of China intended to clarify the Japanese properties in Northeast China that were not specifically discussed in the Yalta Pact – for example, the heavy industry facilities established by Country of Manchuria, which is the puppet state of Japan – before the dispatch of the Soviet Union troops for fear of that the Soviet Union would have power over the facilities. However, during the Sino-Soviet negotiation, the Soviet Union avoided to give a clear answer and rather assured China not to treat the country unfairly. Since the pro-Soviet policies were inherited from the Roosevelt administration at that time, the U.S. government did not take seriously the Soviet Union’s interest into the Northeastern industrial facilities. However, U.S. ambassador William A. Harriman to the Soviet Union, who was a hardliner on the Soviet Union, was keeping his eyes on the movements of the dispatched Soviet troops. The dispatched soviet troops to Northeast China preoccupied the heavy industry properties and other financial assets of Japan and exclusively took them out of China under the name of war trophies after being surrendered by Japan. In this regard, two points are noteworthy: One is the interpretation of the term ‘war trophies’. The three states of China, the U.S. and the Soviet Union used the same term ‘war trophies’ but with different interpretations. While the Soviet Union interpreted the term ‘war trophies’ as the things that can be taken by the belligerents as they want at the occupied territory, China and the U.S. interpreted the term as the war reparations that are jointly discussed and distributed by the victorious country. However, before the discussion, the Soviet Union already took out over 80% of the Japanese assets from Northeast China. Another point is the issue of how to interpret the conflicts between the U.S. and the Soviet Union on Northeast China, which started to be raised from early 1946. As Truman gave up the pro-Soviet policies by Roosevelt in early 1946, many researchers have been considering it as the start of the Cold War by focusing on the fact that the ideological conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union began to emerge. However, it is considered that the open-door policy served as a key factor of the strong stance of the U.S. against the Soviet Union in the conflict between China and the U.S. and the Soviet Union occurred during the disposal of the enemy properties in Northeast China. In other words, the conflicts of national interest between the U.S. and the Soviet Union were likely to occur as Harriman argued that the open-door policy may be deterred, which has been pursued by the U.S. for economic expansion to overseas; Truman accepted the argument, causing conflicts with the Soviet Union; and the Soviet Union tried to monopolize the war trophies for economic benefits for national reconstruction. Therefore, it can be considered that the break of peace in Northeast China in 1945 was more caused by the imperialistic elements appeared as the nations pursued their own interests rather than the ideological elements.