獨島와 그 周邊水域에 對한 韓國의 主權行使

Abstract

The 1952 Korean Proclamation of the Rhee Line surrounding the Korean peninsula with several straight lines was similar to the regime of the EEZ, as it comprised the water-column and the seabed of the adjacent seas up to the possible maximum outer-limits. It was soon vehemently criticized by Japan, as it would drive out incoming Japanese fishermen from the declared seas. Japan also claimed the ownership of the islet of Dokdo or Takeshima, which was included in the Rhee Line, asserting that it used to be a Japanese territory before the 1910 annexation. Protracted negotiations over a decade produced the 1965 Japan/ Korea Fisheries Agreement, wherein Korea allowed the Japanese fishermen to fish in the entire Korean waters beyond 12 mile exclusive zone. As a result, the Rhee Line was no longer to be applicable to the Japanese fishermen. Dokdo was left without any 12 mile exclusive zone in the hazy zone of joint fisheries resources survey outside of the zone of joint fisheries resources preservation. In the 1999 Japan/Korea Fisheries Agreement, Dokdo was to be located in the nameless zone of joint management of fisheries, influenced by the “provisional arrangement of a practical nature” as provided in Articles 74 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. There was a vehement criticism over such an arrangement in Korea, because the rocky islet of Dokdo has not been regarded as a disputed one by Korea due to the solid evidential facts and the sound legal bases. South Korea had to accept such an arrangement ‘unwillingly’ while she was under IMF management when it needed Japan’s help during the financial crisis. It had to persuade the angry Koreans saying that the nameless interme-diate zone has no character of joint management, since the rocky islet can generate only a 12 mile territorial sea without existence of any possibly sustainable human habitation or economic life of its own. However, in May 2006 when Japan attempted to conduct a scientific survey over the seabed around the disputed islet, Korea had to abandon the theory, newly asserting that it can generate 200 mile EEZ for it can sustain human habitation and economic life of its own, emphasizing upon the 'possible capacity standard’ provided in Article 121 (3) of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Due to the change, Korea came to face a difficulty in denying any existence of a character of a joint management in the nameless zone, which would no longer be regarded as a zone with a character of the high seas, since it is consequently a potential EEZ generated from the disputed islet. In July 2008, the US Board of Geographical Names labelled the islet as ‘sovereignty undesignated’ due to an appraisal that Korea is in lack of integrity in exercising its sovereign rights generating from the islet. The BGN had to restore the label of the Korean sovereignty as advised by President Bush who would otherwise face vehement protest during his coming visit to Seoul in early August. It is interesting to note that the BGN has maintained the Japanese sovereignty over the disputed Senkaku islets due to the fact that Japan has exercised its full sovereign rights without making any provisional arrangement in the marginal seas off the islets with China or Taiwan. South Korea should learn such a wisdom from Japan in exercising full sovereign rights over Dokdo if it would persuade a third party like the BGN that it is exercising its sovereign rights over Dokdo and its marginal seas.