유식(唯識)의 이유에 대한 요가 철학의 비판

Abstract

Commentators on the Yogasūtra considered that the Yogācāra principle of vijñaptimātra(consciousness only) was based on ‘theories of the co-occurrence of thought and object’(sahopalambha-niyama) and ‘knowability of the object’(vedyatva). Their understanding of the Yogācāra position can be summarized as follows: (1) a cognition and the object of the cognition are the same and occur at the same time, which is regarded as the co-occurrence of thought and object; (2) a cognition is consciousness’s self-cognition(consciousness is actually perceiving itself), which is called knowability of the object. Therefore, there can be no object without consciousness, but there is cognition without its object. Thus, the Yogācāra maintains that the object of cognition belongs to the consciousness. From the perspective of Yoga philosophy, however, a cognitive activity or consciousness is a mere function of the mind; therefore, cognition should depend on real objects and vary from object to object. The Yogasūtra-bhāṣya shows the unshakable premise for Yoga philosophy to deny the position of the Yogācāra: “There may be an object of common interest to many minds; it is not figured by one mind, nor by many minds, but is grounded in itself.” This premise affirms the independent reality of the external object. Vācaspati Miśra, representing the Yoga school’s refutation of vijñaptimātra, focused on demonstrating the independent existence of the external object. His argument is based on the Sankhya’s theory of three guṇas. In the course of elaborating his refutation of the Yogācāra idealism, Vācaspati Miśra first applied ‘the deviant fallacious reason’(anaikāntika) to his claim that the co-occurrence of thought and object and knowability of the object could not be a decisive reason to support the Yogācāra’s position. He appears to have made good use of the debates among Buddhist schools at that time. Secondly, he devoted to criticize the Yogācāra notion that a perception of an object contains both grossness and externality of the object. He seemingly considered that the Yogācāra took the notion as the prerequisite of knowability of the object(vedyatva). In other words, his criticism implies that knowability of the object, equivalent to Yogācāra’s sva-saṃvedana(self-cognition), is a fallacy because an idea can never possess both grossness and externality of an object. According to him, it is not possible that an idea has extended into more spaces than one and yet co-existed separately in separate places. Lastly, on the basis of the theory of three guṇas, Vācaspati Miśra claims that even though many people perceive the same object, their cognitions of it are various. According to him, various cognitions of an object can be caused by the functions and actions of three guṇas that constitute everything but puruṣa; therefore, the cause of various cognitions is an object made up of three guṇas. Thus, if an object made of three guṇas causes a cognition, the Yogācāra notions of the co-occurrence of thought and object(sahopalambha-niyama) and knowability(self- cognition) cannot support the theory of vijñaptimātra.