兩全과 擇一 사이에서 ― 1619~1622년 조선의 이중외교 ―

Abstract

After the Battle of Sarhū in 1619, the Joseon government pursued a policy of dual diplomacy with both the Ming and the Later Jin. Although the Later Jin won the battle, the Ming still remained a formidable power. The Later Jin sought to draw Joseon to its side in order to cut the wing of the Ming, while the Ming strove not to lose its traditional ally. Both sides employed conciliatory as well as coercive measures simultaneously. While the Ming and the Later Jin were engaged in full-scale war, the Joseon government tried to avoid military cooperation with the Ming if possible, while at the same time maintaining negotiations with the Later Jin, thus developing a form of dual diplomacy. This policy of dual diplomacy lasted until 1622, and was ceased the following year with the ‘Restoration (反正)’ of 1623. However, after the First Manchurain Invasion of 1627, it became established as an official framework of foreign relations. This article examines Joseon’s dual diplomacy by dividing it into three phases: 1619, when the Ming and the Later Jin focused on conciliatory approaches to win Joseon’s allegiance; 1620, when the war between the Ming and the Later Jin entered a temporary lull; and 1621-1622, when the war resumed. This would show the perspective of Joseon, which had to choose ‘Wholeheartness to the Both’ by both imperative justification and strategic necessity at the crossroads of ‘Choice of Either’.