죄를 묻는 시선과 주체의 자기기만 -이청준의 「병신과 머저리」를 중심으로 -

Abstract

This article examines the characteristics of sin(consciousness), which is the driving force of brother’s writing behavior in “A Fool and an Idiot”, based on Sartre’s theory (“being and nothing”), with its starting point and main clues in ‘a gaze of a person’. The gaze as a ‘blue light’ of the other-Kim, who emerged facing his brother’s peeping eyes, becomes the core of the ‘essential alteration’ in which the brother asks back the legitimacy and ethics of his existence. The alteration at this time can be said to be the occurrence of ‘shame’, which is the cause of the sadistic attitude toward others among the subject’s ‘weird fight’ to escape from the figure. The subject, who was immersed in a kind of struggle for recognition of escapism, moves to the point of sin(consciousness) that looks back on himself from the perpetrator’s position with the empty gaze of the other person like a scar and the ‘one-shot sound’. It should be noted that this change to sin(consciousness) can only emerge after the experience of one’s own narcissism breaking, which is supported by the fact that the emotional mechanism of the refractory type moves toward realizing the point of sin hidden in ‘clear memory’ from the shame that was the cause of the ‘eye fight’. This self-awareness of sin becomes the ultimate driver for the older brother to start writing as reflection and reflection. However, the reason why it is difficult for the brother’s writing to be completely included within the confession or reflection is because of the point of some ‘insincere trick’ hidden in the internalization of the “A Fool and an Idiot” type. This can be called ‘self-deception’ in Sartre's term, and this article points out that his brother’s writing is eventually between guilt and self-deception through a close search. The fact that the brother’s writing lies between guilt and self-deception means that this act for the purpose of confession and reflection will eventually fail in achieving its purpose. However, the paradoxical point of self-deception in the relationship with the subject replaces this failure with the ethical possibility of knowing, because only when the ‘bad belief’ of self-deception is broken as a failure can the subject reach the right point of perception of oneself.