일본의 지방선거에 있어서 정당공천의 현상과 제도:왜 무소속이 많은가?

Abstract

It is legally permitted for political parties to nominate candidates in the Japanese local elections, but they are characterized by competition among many non-partisan candidates and, ultimately, elects. The purpose of this study is to analyze the causes for this phenomenon in Japan. Based on the rational choice institutionalism, the author developed the hypothesis that if district magnitude is increased, number of non-partisan candidates and elect will increase. The results of the analysis shows, first of all, institutional change in 1994 from the medium electorate system to the single-member electorate system for the House of Representatives caused decrease of non-partisan candidates and elect. Second, comparison among House of Representatives election, prefectural assembly election and local councils election shows that number of non-partisan candidates and elect increased more in local councils election(major electorate system) than in prefectural assembly election(major, medium and minor electorate system), and than in prefectural assembly election than in House of Representatives election(single-member electorate system). Third, the results of the regression analysis in prefectural assembly election shows that non-partisan candidates and elect are significantly changed with district magnitude. The author argues, base on these results, that we need to consider both normative criteria and electoral institutional factors for designing better electoral systems in Korea.