비트겐슈타인은 중립적 일원론자인가?
Is Wittgenstein a neutral monist?
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쿡(John W. Cook)은 비트겐슈타인이 1916년부터 그의 생애까지 마지막까지 윌리엄 제임스가 발전시킨 ‘중립적 일원론’을 수용했다고 주장한다. 필자는 이러한 쿡의 주장이 과연 정당한지를 검토할 것이다. 이 목표를 위해 지금까지 두 철학자들 사이의 관계를 확인하려 시도했던 저자들이 완전히 간과했던 제임스의 후기 논문들에 초점을 맞추면서, 의식에 관한 제임스와 후기 비트겐슈타인의 관점을 비교할 것이다. 이 연구 결과들로부터, 필자는 의식에 관한 제임스의 후기 입장이 비트겐슈타인에게 중요한 영향을 미쳤을 가능성이 매우 높다는 가설을 세울 수 있게 하는 두 철학자들이 서로 공유하는 중요한 국면들을 밝힐 것이다. 비록 이 증거들이 제임스의 중립적 일원론을 형성하는 주요 아이디어들을 비트겐슈타인이 공유한다는 사실을 보여주지만, 그렇다고 비트겐슈타인 역시 중립적 일원론자였음을 확인시켜주지는 못한다. 쿡은 『논고』 안에 나타난 ‘유아론’과 ‘단순 대상’ 개념의 의미를 오해하면서 비트겐슈타인이 입장을 중립적 일원론으로 해석하고 있지만, 이 두 개념은 비트겐슈타인의 논리-언어적 기획에 따라서 이해되어야 한다. 『논고』 이후의 경우, 쿡은 비트겐슈타인이 “‘감각자료’가 ‘물리적 대상’과 다른 종류의 대상이라고 생각하지 않았다”(BB p. 64)는 것을 근거로 그가 중립적 일원론자임을 주장한다. 하지만 이 언명을 통해 비트겐슈타인이 뜻한 바는, 쿡의 주장처럼, 감각자료에 너머의 어떤 것으로서의 이원론적 관점의 물리적 대상을 기각하려는 것이 아니라, ‘나’, ‘감각자료’, ‘물리적 대상’과 같은 낱말에 대한 문법적 탐구를 통해 의식의 대상화에 대한 경고를 하고 있을 뿐이다. 결국, 쿡의 주장처럼, 비트겐슈타인이 존재론적으로 물리적 대상을 감각자료로 환원하는 중립적 일원론을 견지했다고 결론내릴 어떠한 근거도 없다.
Abstract
John W. Cook argues that from 1916 until his death, Wittgenstein had embraced ‘neutral monism’ that was originally developed by William James. To investigate whether this ascription of ‘neutral monism’ to Wittgenstein is valid, I will draw a comparison between James’ and Wittgenstein’s views on consciousness, focusing on James’ later essays, which present his mature view on consciousness by adopting ‘neutral monism’.Other authors who have tried to identify a relationship between the two philosophers, have totally ignored this approach. Among the results of this research, I excavate some significant features shared by the two philosopher’s positions, which make us conclude that it is highly possible to hypothesize that the later works of James may have had an important influence on Wittgenstein’s view on consciousness. Although this evidence shows that Wittgenstein shares with James some very important ideas which serve to constitute James’ neutral monist views, it does not confirm that Wittgenstein was a supporter of neutral monism. Cook explicitly interprets Wittgenstein’s position in the Tractatus as Neutral monism, misunderstanding the meaning of ‘solipsism’ and that of ‘simple objects’ in the tractarian sense. However, both terms are supposed to be understood as Wittgenstein’s logico-linguistic commitments. In the case of the post-tractarian period, Cook argues that Wittgenstein does not think that ‘a sense-datum is a different kind of object from a physical object’ (BB p. 64). However, what Wittgenstein means by this assertion is not to dismiss the physical object of dualistic view, which is something over and above sense-data, as Cook insists, but rather to simply warn against the objectification of consciousness, as a result of this grammatical research for the words ‘I’ and ‘sense-datum’. Consequently, there is no reason to conclude that Wittgenstein maintains a neutral monist view, ontologically reducing physical objects to sense-data, as Cook insists.
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