연기금의 기업지배적 역할의 활성화 방안
A Study on Stimulating the Corporate Governance Role of the Pension Funds
3
조회
0
다운로드
6
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
The corporate governance has been the focus on control functions of organizations of a company such as board of directors, supervisory board, or general meetings, etc. during the last decades, however, these days the external monitoring, especially institutional investors become more powerful in securities market. The profile of optimal monitor seemingly includes the following elements: (1) an ability to hold large equity stakes; (2) an inclination to hold for the longer term over which improved monitoring can pay off; and (3) the absence of any substantial conflict of interest. On this basis, pension funds seem potentially superior to banks and other creditor-shareholders. However, as well as the composition of the board of trustees in pension funds, the differences in boards' responsibilities, practices, and policies should have an impact on the plan's funding status and performance. Therefore, the board of trustees must be able to prevent the political misuse of the fund's assets and have the expertise and motivation to ensure successful investment performance. Similar to the envisioned for independent directors in corporate governance, there is a role for member-elected trustees. These trustees are motivated, accountable to plan beneficiaries, and independent of political influence. Accordingly, the board of trustees should be organized as the majority of the elected trustees than ex officio trustees and appointed trustees. Moreover, all trustees are subject to a "prudent person" requirement by legislation, which is similar to the corporate directors' duty of care standard.
Abstract
The corporate governance has been the focus on control functions of organizations of a company such as board of directors, supervisory board, or general meetings, etc. during the last decades, however, these days the external monitoring, especially institutional investors become more powerful in securities market. The profile of optimal monitor seemingly includes the following elements: (1) an ability to hold large equity stakes; (2) an inclination to hold for the longer term over which improved monitoring can pay off; and (3) the absence of any substantial conflict of interest. On this basis, pension funds seem potentially superior to banks and other creditor-shareholders. However, as well as the composition of the board of trustees in pension funds, the differences in boards' responsibilities, practices, and policies should have an impact on the plan's funding status and performance. Therefore, the board of trustees must be able to prevent the political misuse of the fund's assets and have the expertise and motivation to ensure successful investment performance. Similar to the envisioned for independent directors in corporate governance, there is a role for member-elected trustees. These trustees are motivated, accountable to plan beneficiaries, and independent of political influence. Accordingly, the board of trustees should be organized as the majority of the elected trustees than ex officio trustees and appointed trustees. Moreover, all trustees are subject to a "prudent person" requirement by legislation, which is similar to the corporate directors' duty of care standard.
참고문헌 (26)
- 강윤식, "기관투자자의 의결권행사 개선방안 공청회 지상중계", CGReview, 36 (2008), Corporate Governance Service
- 2009 기관투자자 의결권 행사 실태와 문제점: 기관투자자, 제 역할 하려면 아직 갈 길 멀어, "경제개혁연대", ~, pp.「경제개혁 리포트」 2009-5호
- 국민연금의 거시경제 파급효과와 기금의 장기운용방향, "국민연금기금장기운용전략기획단", 국민연금 기금장기운용전략 기획단, ~ (2007)
- 2007년 국민연금 기금운영 연차보고서, "국민연금연구원", 국민연금공단, ~ (2008)
- 김우찬, "국민연금의 의결권행사 실태와 그 개선방향", CGReview, 45 (2009), Corporate Governance Service
- 김인준, "기관투자가의 역할 활성화방안", 투신 (1999), 투자신탁협회
- 기관투자자의 의결권 행사에 관한 연구, "박상수", 한국상장회사협의회, ~ (1996)
- 박종렬, "기관투자자로써 연기금의 활성화 방안", 기업법연구, 11, pp.119~142 (2002), 한국기업법학회
- 이봉주, "퇴직연금론" (2006), 박영사
- 이상복, "기업지배구조와 기관투자자의 역할", 기업법연구, 22(4), pp.247~292 (2008), 한국기업법학회
- 이준섭, "機關投資者의 企業支配的 役割", 상사법연구, 22(2), pp.45~84 (2003), 한국상사법학회
- 기업연금의 지배구조 설계에 관한 소고, "임영재", 한국개발연구원, ~ (2003)
- 증권거래소, "“기관투자자 역할제고를 위한 설문조사결과”, 증권거래소 보도자료 2003. 7. 8", ~ (2003)
- 최정식, "증권집단소송제도에 관한 법적연구", 박사, pp.2005
- 한철, "지속가능한 발전을 위한 기업지배구조의 개선 -공적 연금기금의 법리를 중심으로-", 기업법연구, 23(3), pp.35~62 (2009), 한국기업법학회
- David Hess, "Protecting and Politicizing Public Pension Fund Assets: Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Governance Structures and Practices", U. C. Davis L. Rev., 39, pp.187~ (2005)
- David Hess, "Governance of Public Pension Funds: Lessons from Corporate Governance and International Evidence, in Public Pension fund Management" (2003)
- Frank H. Easterbrook, "The Race for the Bottom in Corporate Governance", Va. L. Rev., 95, pp.685~ (2009)
- Gordon Tiffany, "Public Employee Retirement Planning", Emp. Benefits J., 28, pp.3~ (2003)
- John C. Coffee, Jr., "Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor", Colum. L. Rev., 91, pp.1277~ (1991)
- Julia L. Coronado, "Public Funds and Private Capital Markets: The Investment Practices and Performance of State and Local Pension Funds", Nat'l Tax J., 56, pp.579~ (2003)
- Michael Dresser, "Maryland Pension Trustees Are Often Absent", Baltimore Sun (2001)
- Mitchell, "Pension Funding in the Public Sector", Rev. of Econ. & Stat., 76, pp.278~ (1994)
- Paul Myners, "Institutional Investment in the United Kingdom: A Review" (2001), HM Treasury
- Sanjai Bhagat, "The Uncertain Relation Between Board Composition and Firm Performance", Bus. Lawyer, 54, pp.921~ (1999)
- Tom Campbell, "State Needs to Convert to a Predictable Pension System", Sacramento Bee (2005)