연기금 기관투자자의 행동주의에 관한 소고
A Study on the Public Pension Fund Activism
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These days, institutional investors play an important role in corporate governance, and especially pension fund become the most powerful one in securities market since it has the following elements : ① an ability to hold large equity stakes ② an inclination to hold for the longer term ③ the absence of any substantial conflict of interest. While the debate surrounding public pensions' involvement in corporate governance remains prevalent, recently, the focus in public pensions has somewhat shifted. Public pensions now face increased scrutiny due to concerns about mismanagement, underfunding and especially politicization. In order to further prevent politicization and to improve trustee decision making in general, the governance of public pensions must be given greater consideration: ① there should be greater disclosure of conflict of interest policies ② training and education of board members - especially member-elected trustees - should become a priority. ③ there should be greater consideration of th role of member-elected trustees. Moreover, this Article suggests that there is a need for a well-balanced board and not a board dominated by any particular class of trustees.
Abstract
These days, institutional investors play an important role in corporate governance, and especially pension fund become the most powerful one in securities market since it has the following elements : ① an ability to hold large equity stakes ② an inclination to hold for the longer term ③ the absence of any substantial conflict of interest. While the debate surrounding public pensions' involvement in corporate governance remains prevalent, recently, the focus in public pensions has somewhat shifted. Public pensions now face increased scrutiny due to concerns about mismanagement, underfunding and especially politicization. In order to further prevent politicization and to improve trustee decision making in general, the governance of public pensions must be given greater consideration: ① there should be greater disclosure of conflict of interest policies ② training and education of board members - especially member-elected trustees - should become a priority. ③ there should be greater consideration of th role of member-elected trustees. Moreover, this Article suggests that there is a need for a well-balanced board and not a board dominated by any particular class of trustees.
참고문헌 (36)
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