Burdens of Proof and Judicial Errors in Civil Litigation
0
조회
0
다운로드
0
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
This paper considers the effect of whether burden of proof is assigned to plaintiffs or defendants in tort claims on the defendant’s care-taking incentive under the possibility of judicial error. We argue that it is socially better to place burden of proof on the plaintiff if the proof costs of both parties are low and the evidence is very accurate, thus reducing the wasteful incentive for defendants to commit over-precaution. If the burden of proof is placed on the defendant, it exacerbates the defendant’s over-precaution due to an accidentavoidance effect whereby the defendant is incentivized to take more care to avoid an accident, thereby saving evidence costs. We also discuss the sine qua non rule in the case of noisy evidence and reconfirm the accident-avoidance effect. This is compared to the result of Gómez (2002).
Abstract
This paper considers the effect of whether burden of proof is assigned to plaintiffs or defendants in tort claims on the defendant’s care-taking incentive under the possibility of judicial error. We argue that it is socially better to place burden of proof on the plaintiff if the proof costs of both parties are low and the evidence is very accurate, thus reducing the wasteful incentive for defendants to commit over-precaution. If the burden of proof is placed on the defendant, it exacerbates the defendant’s over-precaution due to an accidentavoidance effect whereby the defendant is incentivized to take more care to avoid an accident, thereby saving evidence costs. We also discuss the sine qua non rule in the case of noisy evidence and reconfirm the accident-avoidance effect. This is compared to the result of Gómez (2002).
참고문헌 (27)
- Berger, M., "When, if Ever, Does Evidentiary Error Constitute Reversible Error", Loyala of Los Angeles Law Review, 25, pp.893~908 (1992)
- Calfee, J. E., "Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards", Virginia Law Review, 70, pp.965~1004 (1984)
- Cooter, R. D., "An Economic Case for Comparative Negligence", New York University Law Review, 61, pp.1067~1110 (1986)
- Craswell, R., "Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 2, pp.279~303 (1986)
- Demougin, D., "Deterrence Versus Judicial Error : A Comparative View of Standards of Proof", Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 161, pp.193~206 (2005)
- Demougin, D., "Rules of Proof, Courts, and Incentives", Rand Journal of Economics, 39, pp.20~40 (2008)
- Diamond, P., "Single Activity Accidents", Journal of Legal Studies, 3, pp.107~164 (1974)
- Edlin, A. S., "Efficient Standards of Due Care: Should Courts Find More Parties Negligent under Comparative Negligence?", International Review of Law and Economics, 14, pp.21~34 (1994)
- Farrell, J., "Voluntary Disclosure: Robustness of the Unraveling Result, and Comments on Its Importance", Proceedings of the U.C. Santa Cruz Conference on Regulation and Antitrust, pp.91~103 (1986), Heath-Lexington
- Gómez, F., "Konsequenzen wirtschaftsrechtlicher Normen, Part of the Series Ökonomische Analyse des Rechts", pp.367~389 (2002)
- Grady, M., "A New Positive Economic Theory of Negligence", Yale Law Journal, 92, pp.799~829 (1983)
- Grossman, S., "The Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality", Journal of Law and Economics, 24, pp.461~483 (1981)
- Guerra, A., "Presumption of Negligence and the Robustness of Liability Incentives", ~ (2019)
- Haddock, D., "An Economic Theory of Comparative Negligence", Journal of Legal Studies, 16, pp.49~72 (1985)
- Hay, B., "Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation : An Economic Perspective", Journal of Legal Studies, 26, pp.413~431 (1997)
- Kahan, M., "Causation and Incentives to Take Care under the Negligence Rule", Journal of Legal Studies, 18, pp.427~447 (1989)
- Kaplow, L., "Optimal Burden of Proof", Journal of Political Economy, 119, pp.1104~1140 (2011)
- Kim, J. -Y., "A Note on Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation", European Journal of Law and Economics, 42, pp.325~337 (2016)
- Milgrom, P., "Good News and Bad News : Representation Theorems and Applications", Bell Journal of Economics, 12, pp.380~391 (1981)
- Salvador-Coderch, P., "Scope of Liability: The Vanishing Distinction between Negligence and Strict Liability", European Journal of Law and Economics, 28, pp.257~287 (2009)
- Sanchirico, C., "A Primary-Activity Approach to Proof Burdens", Journal of Legal Studies, 37, pp.273~313 (2008)
- Savchyn, N., "Judicial Errors in Civil Proceedings: Concept, Causes, and Procedural Methods of Their Prevention", Jurisprudence, 21, pp.484~505 (2014)
- Schweizer, U., "Legal Damages for Losses of Chances", International Review of Law and Economics, 29, pp.153~160 (2009)
- Shavell, S., "Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale", Rand Journal of Economics, 25, pp.20~36 (1994)
- Shin, H. -S., "Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures in Arbitration", Rand Journal of Economics, 29, pp.378~405 (1998)
- Sobel, J., "Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining", pp.341~361 (1985), Cambridge University Press
- Stremitzer, A., "The Robustness Case for Proportional Liability", B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 14, pp.1~25 (2014)