Optimal Contracts under Moral Hazard and Costly Lying
1
조회
0
다운로드
0
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
We present a model in which the agent reports a privately observed signal about the stochastic outcome of her action, while bearing a cost of misreporting her private information. If the agent receives a low payment contingent on her performance, it is very costly for the agent to misreport her information to the principal so that the principal makes a decision favorable to the agent. However, if the contingent compensation is too high, the principal will terminate the project unless the agent truthfully reports that the project is likely to give a high return. The optimal outcome is achieved by a contract with the fee structure loosely tied with the outcome, but the cost of lying is necessarily high.
Abstract
We present a model in which the agent reports a privately observed signal about the stochastic outcome of her action, while bearing a cost of misreporting her private information. If the agent receives a low payment contingent on her performance, it is very costly for the agent to misreport her information to the principal so that the principal makes a decision favorable to the agent. However, if the contingent compensation is too high, the principal will terminate the project unless the agent truthfully reports that the project is likely to give a high return. The optimal outcome is achieved by a contract with the fee structure loosely tied with the outcome, but the cost of lying is necessarily high.
참고문헌 (17)
- Bergemann, Dirk, "Information Structures in Optimal Auctions", Journal of Economic Theory, 137(1), pp.580~609 (2007)
- Bolton, Patrick, "Outside and Inside Liquidity", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126(1), pp.259~321 (2011)
- Cai, Li, "The Moral Hazard Problem in Hedge Funds: A Study of Commodity Trading Advisors", The Journal of Portfolio Management, 43(2), pp.77~89 (2017)
- Celik, Gorkem, "Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision", Journal of Economic Theory, 144(1), pp.69~95 (2009)
- Cho, In-Koo, "Strategic Stability and Uniqueness in Signaling Games", Journal of Economic Theory, 50(2), pp.381~413 (1990)
- Corgnet, Brice, "Are You a Good Employee or Simply a Good Guy? Influence Costs and Contract Design", Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 92, pp.259~272 (2013)
- Crawford, Vincent P., "Strategic Information Transmission", Econometrica, pp.1431~1451 (1982)
- Eső, Péter, "Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction", The Review of Economic Studies, 74(3), pp.705~731 (2007)
- Faure-Grimaud, Antoine, "Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information", The Review of Economic Studies, 70(2), pp.253~279 (2003)
- Ganuza, Juan-José, "Signal Orderings Based on Dispersion and the Supply of Private Information in Auctions", Econometrica, 78(3), pp.1007~1030 (2010)
- Healy, Paul M., "The Fall of Enron", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17(2), pp.3~26 (2003)
- Holmstrom, Bengt, "Moral Hazard and Observability", Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1), pp.74~91 (1979)
- Holmström, Bengt, "Inside and Outside Liquidity" (2011), MIT press
- Kartik, Navin, "Strategic Communication with Lying Costs", The Review of Economic Studies, 76(4), pp.1359~1395 (2009)
- Metrick, Andrew, "The Economics of Private Equity Funds", The Review of Financial Studies, 23(6), pp.2303~2341 (2010)
- A Study on Delegation Management of Investment in Alternative Assets for NPS Funds, "Rhee, Keeyoung", ~ (2019)
- Roger, Guillaume, "Optimal Contract under Moral Hazard with Soft Information", American Economic Journal : Microeconomics, 5(4), pp.55~80 (2013)