A Model of Infinitely Repeated Litigation with Correlated Decisions
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This paper considers a model of repeated litigation in which a single long-lived defendant faces an infinite sequence of short-lived plaintiffs. Court decisions are correlated across periods, rejecting the presence of precedent effects. We derive unique Markov perfect equilibrium payoffs for the long-lived defendant, and compare them to the predictions of a corresponding two-period benchmark model.
Abstract
This paper considers a model of repeated litigation in which a single long-lived defendant faces an infinite sequence of short-lived plaintiffs. Court decisions are correlated across periods, rejecting the presence of precedent effects. We derive unique Markov perfect equilibrium payoffs for the long-lived defendant, and compare them to the predictions of a corresponding two-period benchmark model.
참고문헌 (11)
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