The Significance of Virtuous Character
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My aim in this essay is to argue that an adequate ethical theory should be primarily focused on our characters, not just our actions. That is, I argue that an adequate ethical theory should advise the agent to focus on cultivating good character as such, not just in relation to its tendency to lead us to perform a certain type of actions. I claim that action-focused theories, that is, theories focusing mainly on right actions, tend to lead the agent to miss out on ethically important elements of inner life. Then I argue that a theory that does not regard good character as of primary value cannot give an adequate account for appropriate motivations for action. In particular, I focus on showing that consequentialism, at least the version of it that attaches only instrumental value to good character and motive, fails in this respect. Next, I address the suspicion that a long-standing character is not required for an agent to act virtuously, that is, to act from appropriate motivation. I conclude that we should cultivate good character for appropriate emotional and appetitive responses, since such responses are ethically important independently of their influence on our actions.
Abstract
My aim in this essay is to argue that an adequate ethical theory should be primarily focused on our characters, not just our actions. That is, I argue that an adequate ethical theory should advise the agent to focus on cultivating good character as such, not just in relation to its tendency to lead us to perform a certain type of actions. I claim that action-focused theories, that is, theories focusing mainly on right actions, tend to lead the agent to miss out on ethically important elements of inner life. Then I argue that a theory that does not regard good character as of primary value cannot give an adequate account for appropriate motivations for action. In particular, I focus on showing that consequentialism, at least the version of it that attaches only instrumental value to good character and motive, fails in this respect. Next, I address the suspicion that a long-standing character is not required for an agent to act virtuously, that is, to act from appropriate motivation. I conclude that we should cultivate good character for appropriate emotional and appetitive responses, since such responses are ethically important independently of their influence on our actions.
참고문헌 (13)
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- Williams, Bernard, "Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline" (2006), Princeton University