Motives and Utilitarian Concern

Abstract

This paper argues against the utilitarian suggestion of there being no close relationship between the morality of an action and the motive the agents have to perform the action. After stating explicitly what I take to be an important problem for utilitarians, I cite some examples from ordinary life. The examples are drawn mainly to show that our moral intuition (or, if you like, human psychology) seems to go well with the belief in there being a close relationship between the morality of an action and its motive. I shall then try to reconstruct and state the utilitarian argument, especially the one given by J. S. Mill in his 1863 work, to the conclusion that such moral intuition fails to hold true. Or, alternatively I shall try to reconstruct and state explicitly the utilitarian attempts to explain away our moral intuition. I take these two tasks are one and the same. Finally, with the evaluation of the arguments (or the attempts), I shall conclude that the utilitarian argument, especially by Mill, fails to prove the non-existence of the close relationship between the morality of an action and its motive.