정약용의 성 기호설 - 윤리적 자연주의의 시각에 입각하여 -

Abstract

This article analyzes Jeong Yag-yeong (丁若鏞, 1762-1836)'s theory of human nature as moral inclination under the rubric of ethical naturalism, arguing first that Jeong's methodology of defining the characteristic of human nature is naturalistic, and second that the term “moral inclination" per se is emphasizing human's natural sentiment. In probing the essence of human nature, Jeong refused to consider anything metaphysical, that is to say, anything beyond empirical verification. In addressing the hotly debated topics of his time, such as the sameness (or difference) between human and animal nature, and the sameness/difference between the sage and the common mind, Jeong always attempted to ‘prove’ the value proposition through the personal and social evidence of experience and investigation, thus revealing the naturalistic character of his philosophy. Moreover, the fact that Jeong neither relied on metaphysical axioms nor did he use intuitive or speculative methods in his process of verification shows that he had freed himself from the tradition of moral metaphysics represented by Zhu Xi (朱熹, 1130-1200) in China and Yi Hwang (李滉, 1501-1570) in Korea. At the same time, he differentiated himself from other Neo-Confucian scholars of his time, who mostly belonged to the school of Yi I (李珥, 1536-1584). Moral inclination is defined as liking the good and disliking the evil and is basically a cognitive emotion, or a moral sentiment. The fact that such sentiment is rooted in the human mind as its unchangeable, indispensable nature - as the only power through which humans can carry out actual moral actions - is the gist of Jeong’s argument. In Jeong’s time, scholars belonging to Rak and Ho line of Yi I school held moral perception through human rationality as the most important element in realizing moral goodness therefore, they put all their effort into proving the ethereal and rational quality of the human mind and into transforming the obtuse bodily temperament into a pure and radiant one. Jeong’s naturalism, on the contrary, contends that being intelligent or rational has nothing to do with being morally good: the moral emotion derived from moral perception is the only relevant element in human mind that leads to actualizing moral goodness. In regards to philosophical genealogy, Jeong’s rejection of metaphysical principle (the movement of li) sets him apart from Zhu Xi and Yi Hwang and places him closer to Yi I. On the other hand, it is clear that Jeong is following in the footsteps of Yi Hwang in his emphasis of moral sentiment rather than rationality. On the basis of such findings, we can refer to Jeong’s theory of human mind as a naturalistic transformation of Yi Hwang's philosophy.