동서의 지적 交錯 : 『천주실의』의 理 해석과 그 반향

Abstract

When Matteo Ricci reassigned “li(理)” to the category of attributes rather than substances and turned the meaning of “zhuzai(主宰)” into “exercizing authority” by ”the Lord of Heaven”, the Neo-Confucian way of thinking that categorized beings with “ti(體)” and “yong(用)” or “suoyi(所以: that by which things are so)” and “zhuoyong(作用: having such and such function), by which Neo-Confucianism depersonalized the meaning of “zhuzai(主宰)” by interpreting “Tian(天)” as “li(理)”, was unilaterally excluded. Based on the common “ti(體)” and “yong(用)” systems, Hayashi Razan and Fukansai Habian in Japan, Huang Zhen and Ji Ji in China, and An Jeongbok in Korea refuted Ricci’s view. However, Dai Zhen and Jeong Yakyong criticized the concept of “suoyi(所以)” or “xingershang(形而上)” as non-Confucian notions derived from Buddhism, insisting that when understood in their original context, Confucian virtues such as “renyilizhi(仁義禮智)” could only be realized once concrete activities had taken place in accordance with the Confucian ideas for desirable human relations. Jeong Yakyong reassigned “renyilizhi(仁義禮智)” to the category of “de(德)”, whose acquisition is only possible through assiduous practice. These explanations were based on the category theory introduced by Ricci in the Tianzhushiyi(天主實義), which claimed that the names that belong to the category of attributes can only gain their identity by depending upon concrete things as their substance. This reflects an instance of “Orientalism” that took place in the 18~19th century, as the Confucian intellectuals of East-Asia had recourse to Ricci’s method to issue a new justification for the original context of the Confucian ideas of human virtue.