베이즈주의와 웨이슨 선택 과제 : 니커슨의 논의를 중심으로
Bayesian Confirmation Theory and the Wason Selection Task : A focus on Nickerson’s approach using the expected confirmation power
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The recent Bayesian cognitive science literature on the Wason selection task has been modeled largely after the philosophy of science literature on the paradox of raven. In this paper, we consider the Bayesian approach to the Wason selection task to analogous models of the paradox of raven. In particular, we focus on Nickerson’s approach. This paper will show the following: (1) Review Nickerson’s approach, which relies on the concept of the expected confirmation power. (2) Show that the concept is related to the problem of measure sensitivity. (3) Selecting confirmation measures suggests one way to avoid the problem. In the end, we find that Nickerson’s approach is not free from the problem of measure sensitivity. And you get the way to selecting confirmation measures that match the expected confirmation power. Nevertheless, the way will serve as a partial solution because there are a variety of confirmation measures. Such a solution will not contribute to a fully fundamental solution.
Abstract
The recent Bayesian cognitive science literature on the Wason selection task has been modeled largely after the philosophy of science literature on the paradox of raven. In this paper, we consider the Bayesian approach to the Wason selection task to analogous models of the paradox of raven. In particular, we focus on Nickerson’s approach. This paper will show the following: (1) Review Nickerson’s approach, which relies on the concept of the expected confirmation power. (2) Show that the concept is related to the problem of measure sensitivity. (3) Selecting confirmation measures suggests one way to avoid the problem. In the end, we find that Nickerson’s approach is not free from the problem of measure sensitivity. And you get the way to selecting confirmation measures that match the expected confirmation power. Nevertheless, the way will serve as a partial solution because there are a variety of confirmation measures. Such a solution will not contribute to a fully fundamental solution.
참고문헌 (18)
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