웨이슨 선택 과제와 믿음의 정확성
The Wason Selection Task and Accuracy of Credences
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초록
본 논문은 정확성을 바탕으로 측정된 인식적 효용을 이용해, 이른바 ‘웨이슨 선택 과제’라고 불리는 심리 실험의 인식론적 특징을 분석하는 것을 목표로 한다. 이를 위해서 인식적 결정 문제가 무엇인지 설명하고(1절), 이에 맞춰 웨이슨 선택 과제가 인식적 결정 문제로 분석될 수 있다는 것을 제안할 것이다(2절). 더불어, 인식적 결정 문제에서 중요한 요소인 인식적 효용이 어떻게 정확성이라는 개념으로 측정될 수 있는지 설명할 것이다(3절). 이런 제안과 설명을 바탕으로 4절과 5절에서는 결정 이론의 핵심적인 두 원리를 이용해 웨이슨 선택 과제의 각 선택이 비교 평가된다. 4절에서는 ‘우월 원리’가, 5절에서는 ‘기대 인식적 효용 최대화 원리’가 도입된다. 이 두 절의 논의를 통해, 우리는 웨이슨 선택 과제 속 피실험자들의 선택이 어떤 점에서 인식적으로 불합리하지 않은지 확인할 수 있을 것이다.
Abstract
This paper is intended to analyze the epistemological features of what is often called ‘Wason Selection Tasks’ by means of epistemic utilities that are measured by the concept ‘accuracy’. For this purpose, this paper is structured as follows: I will explain in Sec. 1 what could be regarded as epistemic decision problems, and suggest in Sec. 2 that the Wason Selection Task can be analyzed as a kind of such a decision problem. Moreover, it is explained in Sec. 3 how epistemic utilities, which are one of the core concept in epistemic decision theory, can be measured using the concept ‘accuracy’. On the basis of the above explanation and suggestion, Secs. 4 and 5 are devoted to comparing and evaluating some actions of the test subjects in the Wason Selection Task. In this regard, I will appeal to the two main principles in the standard epistemic decision theory—Dominance Principle (Sec.4), and the Principle of Maximization of Expected Epistemic Utilities (Sec.5). In doing so, we will understand the reason why we should conclude that the test subjects’ selections, in some sense, can be evaluated as epistemically rational.
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