협조적 게임이론을 응용한 부두건설비용 배분
Cost Allocation of Busan Container Quay
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참고문헌
키워드
초록
본 논문에서는 공통비용 배분문제에 많이 이용되고 있는 협조적 게임이론의 해의 개념인 비례 샤플리밸류, 샤플리밸류, 오웬밸류를 소개하고, 컨테이너부두 건설비용 배분문제를 비용배분게임으로 모형화한 후 2005년 부산항 컨테이너부두 접안실적자료를 이용하여 부두건설비용을 선박, 선사별로 배분해 보았다. 연구결과 현행 접안료 부과방법 하에서는 선박간에 상호보조가 존재하고 있음을 알 수 있었다. 또한 협조적 게임이론을 응용한 비용배분방법은 대형선사를 유치하기 위한 인센티브제도로 활용될 수 있음을 알 수 있었다.
Abstract
This paper presents the Shapley value, the weighted Shapley value and the Owen value which are used well in common cost allocation problem as solution concepts of cooperative game theory, and distributes the costs of quay construction to ships and shipping companies by using berthing data of Busan container quays in 2005. This paper finds that there exists cross subsidy among ships under current method and cost allocation by taking cooperative game theory can be used as incentives to attract mega carriers.
참고문헌 (19)
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