반복 죄수의 딜레마 게임에서의 새로운 전략 공간 그리고 "좋은" 전략의 진화
A New Strategy Space in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game and the Evolution of “Good” Strategies
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초록
대부분의 경우 반복 죄수의 딜레마 게임은 과거 역사 집합에 대한 제한된 가정하에서 분석되어 왔다. 본 연구에서는 경기자들이 반복 게임의 전체 역사 집합을 사용하면서도, 계산가능하고 분석가능하도록 정의된 전략 공간을 가정하고자 한다. 그리고 이러한 전략 공간에서 “좋은” 전략이 갖추어야 할 조건들로 “가해회피 조건”과 “피해회피 조건”을 제시한 후, 이러한 “좋은” 전략으로서의 조건을 갖춘 전략들이 협력을 지탱해주는 전략으로 진화할 수 있음을 보이고자 한다. 그리고 이런 전략들이 실수가 고려되는 환경에서도 효과적인 전략이 됨을 확인할 것이다.
Abstract
Repeated prisoner’s dilemma games have been studied mostly under a restrictive assumption on past history sets. In this paper, we propose a strategy space based on new assumptions on players’ history set which covers the whole history but is computable and analyzable. We propose two conditions that a “good” strategy is required to satisfy; aversion to free-riding on others and aversion to being free-riden by others. We show that the strategies satisfying two conditions for being a “good” strategy evolve and support cooperation. Furthermore, these strategies appear to be effective in errorprone environments.
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