본문 바로가기
KERD
논문KCI 등재

지위 지향적 대리인과 역선택

Status Concerns and Adverse Selection

1

조회

0

다운로드

0

인용

0

참고문헌

키워드

주제분류경제학

초록

기업 내외에서 상대임금을 비교하는 의미로서, 두 종류의 지위 지향적 대리인의 효용함수를 역선택 모형에 적용한다. 기업 내에서 임금비교를 하는 효율적 대리인의 분포가 상대적으로 작을 경우, 표준적 역선택의 생산량 격차보다도 적은 생산량 격차를 초래한다(효율적 대리인의 분포가 상대적으로 많을 경우는 생산량 격차가 보다 증가). 한편, 비교대상이 기업 밖의 상대임금 비교는 표준적 역선택 모형보다 폭 넓은 생산량 격차를 보여 주고 있다. 또한, 기업 내외의 임금 비교와는 관계없이 지위 지향적인 대리인일 수록 양 타입의 사후적 효용 격차가 커진다.* 본 논문은 한국산업조직학회의 故 정병휴 선생님 추모 하계학술대회(2006년 6월 23일)에서 발표한 논문을 수정/보완하였다. 토론자로서 윤기호 교수님을 비롯해, 참석하여 주신 교수님들의 구체적인 토론에 감사를 표한다. 특히, 왕규호 교수님의 개인적 지적은 논문에 귀중한 참고가 되었음에 감사를 드린다. 또한 본 논문에 유익한 논평을 해주신 익명의 심사자들께 진심으로 감사드린다. 특히 두 심사자에 의한 한글문장과 효용함수 등에 대한 지적은 매우 유익하였으며, 본 논문의 완성도를 향상시켰음을 밝혀두고자 한다. ** 부산대학교 국제전문대학원 부교수. Tel: 051-510-2532, Fax: 051-510-7144,E-mail: choipnu@pusan.ac.kr 투고일: 2006. 07. 25 심사일: 2006. 07. 28 최종심사완료일: 2007. 03. 06

Abstract

We investigate the effects of local (resp. global) status concerns in adverse selection problem, where workers compare their wage to the wage of other workers within same firm (resp. industry). To examine the effects of status concerns, we define the status concern that represents the psychological costs and incorporate it into the agent’s utility function. Based on these assumptions, the efficient agent produces less outputs than the first-best level, while the inefficient agent produces more than the second-best level of standard adverse selection output if the proportion of efficient agent is relatively large within same firm and vice versa. However, the efficient agent always produces more outputs than the first-best level, while the inefficient agent produces less than the second-best level of standard adverse selection output within same industry. Although the production spread between the utility functions under status concerns varies, the spread of the ex post information rent goes wider as the degree of status concerns increases.

참고문헌 (40)

  1. "The Intensity of Incentives in Firms and Markets: Moral Hazard with Envious Agents", (2006-14) (2006), University of Munich
  2. "Why Wages Don’t Fall During a Recession" (1999), Harvard University Press
  3. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition", 90, pp.166~193 (2000)
  4. "Does Wage Rank Affect Employee’s Wellbeing?", 1505 (2005)
  5. "Behavioral Game Theory" (2003), Princeton University Press
  6. "Advances in Behavioral Economics" (2004), Princeton University Press
  7. "Do Worker’s Matter? Theory and Evidence on Wage Secrecy, Wage Compression and Effort", 1417 (2004)
  8. "Optimal Incentives in Teams", 91, pp.525~541 (2001)
  9. "Optimal Contract for Ambitious Team Workers" (2005), mimeo, Institute of Economic Academia Sinica
  10. "Unemployment as a Social Norm: Psychological Evidence from Panel Data", 21, pp.323~351 (2003)
  11. "Satisfaction and Comparison Income", 61, pp.359~381 (1996)
  12. "Output and Wages with Inequality Averse Agents", 39, pp.399~413 (2006)
  13. "Income and Happiness: Towards a Unified Theory", 473, pp.465~484 (2001)
  14. "Will Raising the Incomes of All Increase the Happiness of All?", 27, pp.35~48 (1995)
  15. "Trust as an Incentive" (2005), mimeo. Stockholm School of Economics
  16. "Optimal Contracts under Inequity Aversion", 1643 (2005)
  17. "Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism: Experimental Evidence and New Theories", 1 (2006), North-Holland
  18. "Theory of Fairness, Reciprocity: Evidence and Economic Applications", 1, pp.208~257 (2003), Cambridge University Press
  19. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation", 114, pp.817~ (1999)
  20. "A Behavioral Explanation of the Relative Performance Evaluation Puzzle", 71(72), pp.349~362 (2003)
  21. "Cultural Diversity, Status Concerns and the Organization of Work" (2003)
  22. "Status Concerns and the Organization of Work" (2001), mimeo
  23. "Human Behavior and the Quest for Status" (1985), Oxford University Press
  24. "RAND Journal of Economics", pp.510~520 (1984)
  25. "Advancing Beyond Advances in Behavioral Economics", 44, pp.694~711 (2006)
  26. "Overpayment and Earnings Satisfaction: An Application of an Ordered Response Tobit Model", 6, pp.235~238 (1999)
  27. "Envy and Compassion in Tournament", 14, pp.187~207 (2005)
  28. "Interdependence in the Labor Marker", eco(mica), pp.420~429 (1975)
  29. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives", eco(metrica), pp.303~328 (1987)
  30. "Moral Hazard and Other-Regarding Preferences", 55, pp.18~45 (2004)
  31. "Relative Deprivation in Rank-Order Tournaments", 7, pp.385~407 (2000)
  32. "Neighbors as Negatives:Relative Earnings and Well-Being", 120, pp.963~1002 (2005)
  33. "Behavioral Economics Comes of Age:A Review Essay on Advances in Behavioral Economics", 44, pp.712~721 (2006)
  34. "The Role of Fairness in Wage Determination Journal of Labor Economics", pp.243~252 (1993)
  35. "Inequity Aversion and Team Incentives" (2004), mimeo, University of College London
  36. "Dilemmas of An Economic Theorist", 74, pp.865~883 (2006)
  37. "Discussion of Behavior Economics", 2, pp.246~254 (2006), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
  38. "Fairness, Adverse Selection and Employment Contracts", (2005-14) (2005), University of Munich
  39. "Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes", (2293) (2006)
  40. "A Relative Deprivation Approach to Performance Incentives in Career Games and Other Contests", pp.211~227 (1990)

관련 논문AI추천

이 간행물의 다른 논문 (2건)