소비의 외부효과와 수직적 제품 차별화
Consumption Externality and Optimal Vertical Product Discrimination
0
조회
0
다운로드
0
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
다른 소비자의 지불액과 자기의 지불액의 차이가 커질수록 본인의 효용수준이 감소하는 이른바, “시기심”을 가진 효용 함수를 설정하고, 두 유형(high or low type)의 타입으로 분류된 소비자를 대상으로, 독점기업이 어떻게 수직적 품질 차별화를 실시하는지 분석하였다. 구체적으로는, 사적 정보가 없는 이른바 완전정보 하에서의 품질차별화(first-best), 사적 정보가 있는 경우의 품질차별화(second-best), 소비자의 시기심을 가진 경우의 품질 차별화(second-best with envy)를 비교하면서 각각의 경우 달라지는 제약조건의 형태와 의미, 최적 차별화의 해를 비교하였다. 그 결과, 소비자의 타입이 사적 정보가 되는 표준적 역선택 모형과 비교하여 시기심의 개념이 적용된 역선택 모형에서는 재화의 수직적 품질 차이가 더 커지는 것으로 나타났다. 특히 이 경우 저품질 수준이 더욱 낮아짐은 물론, 고품질 수준도 최적 수준과 비교하여 더욱 높아지는 것으로 나타나 그 만큼 비효율이 발생하는 것으로 나타났다.
Abstract
To see the change in equilibrium, we introduce so-called consumption externality in the vertical product discrimination model. Consumers are assumed to have envy against other consumer's level of payment for the product and hence have a decreasing function of the difference between other and own payments in their utility functions. Under the traditional adverse selection model (ie, second-best), the degree of product differentiation is more deepened than under complete information equilibrium (ie, first-best) without any asymmetric information between consumers and the monopoly. In our adverse selection model with envy-augmented utility, the degree of product differentiation (ie, second-best with envy) turns out to be even more deepened than in the traditional adverse selection model. Particularly, in this model with envy utility, level of the high quality are also increased, deviating from the optimal (first-best) level, which means that inefficiency arises.
참고문헌 (32)
- 신태곤, "예금보험제도와 은행의 위험추구에 관한 연구", 23(4) (2005)
- Kim, B, "Product Quality of Monopolist with Network Externality", 23, pp.229~259 (2005)
- Bartling, G, "Intensity of Incentives in Firms and Markets: Moral Hazard with Envious Agents", (2006-14) (2006), University of Munich
- Blinder A. S, "“A Shred of Evidence on Theories of Wage Stickiness” Quarterly Journal of Economics", pp.1003~1015 (1990)
- Bolton, G. E, "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition", 90, pp.166~193 (2000)
- Camerer.C. F, "Behavioral Game Theory" (2003), Princeton University Press.
- Camerer, C. F, "Advances in Behavioral Economics" (2004), Princeton University Press.
- Desiraju, R, "Equity and Adverse Selection" (2007), mimeo, University forthcoming in Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
- Dur, R, "Optimal Incentive Contracts when Workers Envy Their Boss", (03-04-05) (2003), UCI Department of Economics
- Englmaier, F, "Optimal Contracts under Inequity Aversion" (2004), mimeo
- Englmaier, F, "Contracts and Inequity Aversion", (809) (2002)
- Fehr, E, "The Rhetoric of Inequity-Reply" (2005), mimeo
- Fehr, E, "Theory of Fairness, Reciprocity: Evidence and Economic Applications", 1, pp.208~257 (2003), Cambridge University Press. Ch. 6
- Fehr, E, "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation", 114, pp.817~ (1999)
- L, "“A Theory of Social Comparison Processes”", pp.117~140 (1954)
- Frey, S, "Does Pay Motivate Volunteers?", (9) (1999), University of Zurich
- Grund, C, "Envy and Compassion in Tournament", 14(1), pp.187~207 (2005)
- Itoh, H, "Moral Hazard and Other-Regarding Preferences", 55, pp.18~45
- Laffont.J. J, "The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model" (2002), Princeton University Press
- Laffont.J.J, "Regulation of a Risk Averse Firm", 25, pp.149~173 (1998)
- Mussa, "Journal of Economic Theory", “mo(poly and product quality”), pp.301~317 (1978)
- Neilson, W. S, "Piece-Rate Contracts for Other- Regarding Workers" (2004), mimeo, Texas A&M University
- Rey Biel, P, "Inequity Aversion and Team Incentives" (2003), mimeo, University of College London
- Rabin, M, "Alfred Marshall Lecture: A Perspective on Psychology and Economics", 46, pp.657~85 (2002)
- Rotemberg, Julio, J, "Altruism, Reciprocity and Cooperation in the Workplace" (2002), mimeo, Harvard University
- Shaked, A, "The Rhetoric of Inequity Aversion" (2005), mimeo, Bonn University
- Von Siemens, F, "Inequity Aversion and Incentives: Three Essays in Microeconomic Theory" (2004)
- Von Siemens, F, "Inequity Aversion, Adverse Selection and Employment Contracts" (2004), mimeo, University of Munich
- R. M, "“Quality Distortion by a Discriminating Monopolist”", pp.996~1105 (1989)
- Weichenrieder, A. J, "Second Degree Price Discrimination and Natural Monopoly", 56, pp.189~200
- Williams, "in The Ideal of Social Structure Papers in Honor of Robert K. Merton ed. by L. Coser. New York" (1975)
- Williams, "in The Ideal of Social Structure Papers in Honor of Robert K. Merton ed. by L. Coser. New York" (1975)