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The Role of Temporary Disputes in Solving the Hold-up Problem

권남훈
한국계량경제학회|2011.03|계량경제학보 (Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics)|제22권 제1호|pp. 28-57

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참고문헌

키워드

Hold-up problemIncomplete ContractsTemporary Disputes
주제분류경제학

초록

The paper shows that allowing a simple choice such as initiating temporary disputes can cure the holdup problem. This is despite that the specific investments are two-sided, and the nature of the investment is cooperative, the case in which the hold-up problem is the most difficult to overcome. It is because the “dispute” option generates multiple equilibria for the ex post renegotiation game, and they can be conditioned to enforce efficient investments.

Abstract

The paper shows that allowing a simple choice such as initiating temporary disputes can cure the holdup problem. This is despite that the specific investments are two-sided, and the nature of the investment is cooperative, the case in which the hold-up problem is the most difficult to overcome. It is because the “dispute” option generates multiple equilibria for the ex post renegotiation game, and they can be conditioned to enforce efficient investments.

참고문헌 (24)

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