Digital Convergence and Conglomerate Mergers
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We develop a formal model to deal with bundling in complementary markets. We develop the antitrust analysis of a merger between potentially complementary product producing firms when the merged firm might engage in bundling such as the proposed GE/Honeywell merger. Our model can be applied to the analysis of economic consequences of digital convergence. We show that the new multi-functional product as an outcome of digital convergence of two different products does not necessarily enhance competition in markets.
Abstract
We develop a formal model to deal with bundling in complementary markets. We develop the antitrust analysis of a merger between potentially complementary product producing firms when the merged firm might engage in bundling such as the proposed GE/Honeywell merger. Our model can be applied to the analysis of economic consequences of digital convergence. We show that the new multi-functional product as an outcome of digital convergence of two different products does not necessarily enhance competition in markets.
참고문헌 (7)
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- Choi, J.-P, "Merger with Bundling in Complementary Markets" (2003)
- Bundling and the GE, "Honeywell Merger", Nalebuff, B, 2002, Working Paper No. 22
- Patterson, D, "Trans-Atlantic Divergence in GE", Hoenywell: Causes and Lessons, 2001, pp.(Fall), ~
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