An Optimal Incentive Tax Policy on Horizontal Mergers
0
조회
0
다운로드
0
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
This paper analyzes an optimal antitrust policy on horizontal mergers under asymmetric information when antitrust agency cannot observe the post-merger private cost of merged firms. By using a discrete mechanism design approach with self-selection, this paper proposes an incentive compatible lump-sum tax scheme to provide an efficient decision on whether the application for merger should be accepted or rejected. Results show that the optimal size of lump-sum tax is not affected by the informational rent of private post-merger cost information of merged firms.
Abstract
This paper analyzes an optimal antitrust policy on horizontal mergers under asymmetric information when antitrust agency cannot observe the post-merger private cost of merged firms. By using a discrete mechanism design approach with self-selection, this paper proposes an incentive compatible lump-sum tax scheme to provide an efficient decision on whether the application for merger should be accepted or rejected. Results show that the optimal size of lump-sum tax is not affected by the informational rent of private post-merger cost information of merged firms.
참고문헌 (22)
- Andrade, G, "New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(1), pp.103~120 (2001)
- Banal-Estanol, A, "Screening and Merger Activity", Journal of Industrial Economics, 58(4), pp.794~816 (2010)
- Besanko, D, "Contested Mergers and Equilibrium Antitrust Policy", Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 9(1), pp.1~29 (1993)
- Choi, J. P, "Recent Developments in Antitrust" (2006), The MIT Press
- Cosnita, A, "Negotiating Remedies: Revealing the Merger Efficiency Gains", International Journal of Industrial Organization, 27(2), pp.188~196 (2009)
- Farrell, J, "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis", American Economic Review, 80(1), pp.107~126 (1990)
- Tarun Kabiraj, "Technological Asymmetry, Externality, and Merger: The Case of a Three-Firm Industry", Seoul Journal of Economics, 16(1), pp.1~22 (2003), 경제연구소
- Laffont, J. J, "The Theory of Incentives: The Principal- Agent Model" (2002), Princeton University Press
- Lagerlof, J, "On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control", International Journal of Industrial Organization, 23(9), pp.803~827 (2005)
- 이상호, "Optimal Privatization Policy under Asymmetric Information", 산업조직연구, 18(3), pp.59~78 (2010), 한국산업조직학회
- Leveque, F, "Merger Remedies in American and European Union Competition Law" (2004), Edward Elgar Publisher
- Levin, D, "Horizontal Mergers: The 50-Percent Benchmark", American Economic Review, 80(5), pp.1238~1245 (1990)
- McAfee, P, "Horizontal Mergers and Antitrust Policy", Journal of Industrial Economics, 40(2), pp.181~186 (1992)
- Mitchell, M. F, "Persistent Distortionary Policies with Asymmetric Information", American Economic Review, 96(1), pp.387~393 (2006)
- Motta, M, "Efficiency Gains and Myopic Antitrust Authority in a Dynamic Merger Game", International Journal of Industrial Organization, 23(9), pp.777~801 (2005)
- Neven, D, "Consumer Surplus vs. Welfare Standard in a Political Economy Model of Merger Control", International Journal of Industrial Organization, 23(9), pp.829~848 (2005)
- Perry, M. K, "Oligopoly and the Incentive for Horizontal Merger", American Economic Review, 75(1), pp.219~227 (1985)
- Salant, S. W, "Losses from Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium", Quartely Journal of Economics, 48(2), pp.185~199 (1983)
- Vasconcelos, H, "Efficiency Gains and Structural Remedies in Merger Control", Journal of Industrial Economics, 58(4), pp.742~766 (2010)
- Verge, "Horizontal Mergers, Structural Remedies and Consumer Welfare in a Cournot Oligopoly with Assets", Journal of Industrial Economics, 58(4), pp.723~741 (2010)
- Whinston, M. D, "Lectures on Antitrust Economics" (2006), The MIT Press
- Williamson, O, "Economics as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs", American Economic Review, 58(1), pp.18~36 (1968)